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vABSTRACT 
This thesis will argue that the United States should attempt to increase its 
access to training opportunities in the Republic of the Philippines.  In 2003, the 
Pentagon outlined plans which called for the realignment and transformation of 
U.S. forces across the globe.  The planned realignment of U.S. forces in 
Northeast Asia necessitates access to new training areas in Southeast Asia. This 
thesis will identify why the United States should focus its efforts in the Philippines 
by identifying: 1) why U.S.-Philippine political and military relations have warmed 
over the past 15 years, as well as what both countries hope to gain from this 
positive trend; 2) how the expansion of existing, and establishment of new 
training opportunities in the Philippines will enhance U.S. force capabilities while 
also fostering the development of the AFP into a more capable, professional 
armed force; and 3) ways to mitigate possible fears of an increased U.S. 
presence in the area by focusing on the benefits which will arise from it.  
Ultimately, U.S. access to training area in the Philippines will add stability both to 
the Philippines and Southeast Asia as a whole, while simultaneously aiding in the 
























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................. 1 
A. HISTORY OF U.S.-PHILIPPINE RELATIONS..................................... 2 
B. REINVOGRATED U.S.-PHILIPPINE RELATIONSHIP ........................ 3 
C. IMPLICATIONS OF INCREASED U.S. ACCESS................................ 5 
D. MAJOR QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENT ............................................ 9 
II. EBBS AND FLOWS OF THE UNITED STATES-PHILIPPINE SECURITY 
ALLIANCE.................................................................................................... 11 
A. HISTORY OF U.S.-PHILIPPINE SECURITY TIES............................. 11 
B.  BREAKDOWN IN U.S.-PHILIPPINE COLD WAR ALLIANCE .......... 15 
C. REPAIRING THE DAMAGED ALLIANCE......................................... 19 
D. HARDENING THE ALLIANCE .......................................................... 22 
III. IMPORTANCE OF INCREASING UNITED STATES MILITARY ACCESS 
TO PHILIPPINE TRAINING AREAS ............................................................ 27 
A. 2001 QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW ....................................... 27 
B. THE ABU SAYYAF THREAT ............................................................ 30 
C. OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM-PHILIPPINES........................ 32 
D. MUTUAL LOGISTICS SUPPORT AGREEMENT.............................. 36 
E. CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 40 
IV. PERCEPTIONS OF THE INCREASED U.S. PRESENCE IN THE 
PHILIPPINES................................................................................................ 41 
A. TESTING THE VFA: PHILIPPINE RAPE CASE................................ 42 
B. OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM: PHILIPPINE HOSTAGE 
DEBACLE .......................................................................................... 44 
C. CHINA’S NEGATIVE PERCEPTION OF U.S. STRATEGY IN 
SOUTHEAST ASIA............................................................................ 45 
D. ASEAN............................................................................................... 48 
E. MITIGATING FEARS ......................................................................... 49 
F. CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 51 
V. CONCLUSION.............................................................................................. 53 
A. SUMMARY OF RESULTS ................................................................. 53 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS...................................................................... 55 
APPENDIX I  MUSLIM SECESSIONIST GROUPS IN THE PHILIPPINES............. 61 
A. THE MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (MNLF) AND THE 
MORO ISLAMIC LIBERATION FRONT (MILF)................................. 61 
B. RAJAH SOLAIMAN MOVEMENT (RSM) .......................................... 66 
APPENDIX II ........................................................................................................... 67 
A. BAKER PISTON ................................................................................ 67 
B. BALANCE PISTON............................................................................ 67 
C. BALIKATAN ...................................................................................... 67 
D. L-FCARAT ......................................................................................... 67 
E. COBRA GOLD................................................................................... 68 
viii
F. FLASH PISTON ................................................................................. 68 
G. FUSION PISTON................................................................................ 68 
H. HANDA .............................................................................................. 68 
I. MARSEAEX ....................................................................................... 68 
J. MARSURVEX .................................................................................... 69 
K. MTWS ................................................................................................ 69 
L. PALAH............................................................................................... 69 
M. PHIBLEX/MEUEX .............................................................................. 69 
N. PIX...................................................................................................... 69 
O. RIMPAC ............................................................................................. 69 
P. SAGIP ................................................................................................ 70 
Q. SEACAT............................................................................................. 70 
R. TALON VISION.................................................................................. 70 
S. TEAK PISTON ................................................................................... 70 
T. VECTOR BALANCE PISTON............................................................ 71 
LIST OF REFERENCES.......................................................................................... 73 































LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.  U.S. Assistance to Philippines, 2002-2006. ............................................. 25 
Figure 2.  Map of the Republic of the Philippines..................................................... 59 
Figure 3. Map of the southern region of the Philippines, including Mindanao and 




























































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would like to thank my beautiful wife, Marti, and my four talented 
daughters, Quirina, Samantha, Alexandra, and Erin, for their love and untiring 

























































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
1I. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis will argue that the United States should attempt to increase its 
access to training opportunities in the Republic of the Philippines.  In 2003, the 
Pentagon outlined plans which called for the realignment and transformation of 
U.S. forces across the globe.  The planned realignment of U.S. forces in 
Northeast Asia necessitates access to new training areas in Southeast Asia. This 
thesis will identify why the United States should focus its efforts in the Philippines 
by identifying: 
1. Why both political and military relations have warmed between the 
United States and the Republic of the Philippines over the past 15 
years, as well as what the U.S. and the Philippines hope to gain 
from this positive trend. 
2. How increased U.S. access to training opportunities in the 
Philippines will deepen military to military relations between the 
United States and the Philippines, while also increasing the 
capabilities and interoperability of the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines (AFP).  Included will be a case study of Operation 
Enduring Freedom-Philippines.   
3. Lastly, assuming there will be increased U.S. access to training 
opportunities in the Philippines, what negative reactions might be 
expected from within the Philippines as well as other nations in the 
region. 
The expansion of existing, and establishment of new training opportunities 
in the Philippines will enhance U.S. force capabilities while also fostering the 
development of the AFP into a more capable, professional armed force.  The  
continued professional development of the AFP will add stability both to the 
2                                           
Philippines and Southeast Asia as a whole, while simultaneously aiding in the 
Global War on Terror.1
A. HISTORY OF U.S.-PHILIPPINE RELATIONS 
In order to determine why increased U.S. access to Philippine training 
areas is beneficial to both the United States and the Philippines, a review of the 
events which have led up to the planned realignment of U.S. Forces in Northeast 
Asia is required.  Following the failed ratification of the Bases Treaty in 1991, 
relations between the United States and the Philippines hit their lowest point 
since World War II, leading to the departure of U.S. forces from the Philippines to 
Japan and South Korea.2  This event had not only marked the end of almost 100 
years of continuous U.S. military presence in the Philippines, but also meant that 
the Philippine military was now solely responsible for the country’s external and 
internal security.3  This new security challenge would soon point out to the 
Philippine government that, as the AFP was still in dire need of modernization, it 
was ill-equipped for this daunting task.  This was due to internal Philippine 
dynamics as Philippine democratic institutions and practices had both delayed 
and precipitated drastic modification of the proposed AFP modernization 
program.4  
By the mid 1990s rising regional threats coupled with numerous Philippine 
internal security concerns forced both the Philippines and the United States to 
reevaluate their troubled security relationship.  By 1996 the Philippines had yet to 
modernize its military and was in search of ways to reintroduce U.S. security 
assistance its shores.5  The United States, recognizing that the People’s  
 
 
1 White House. The National Military Strategy of the United States of America (2004), 
www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318nms.pdf.  Accessed 12 March, 2006. pp.25-26.
2 Rommel C. Banlaoi. “The Role of Philippine-American Relations in the Global Campaign 
against Terrorism: Implications for Regional Security,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, (August 
2002): p.299. 
3 Renato Cruz De Castro. “The Revitalized Philippine-U.S. Security Relations: A Ghost from 
the Cold War or an Alliance for the 21st Century?” Asian Survey, Issue 6. (2003): p.971. 
4 Renato Cruz De Castro. “Adjusting to the Post-U.S. Bases Era: The Ordeal of the Philippine 
Military’s Modernization Program,” Armed Forces and Society, (Fall 1999): pp.120-25. 
5 Renato Cruz De Castro. “The Revitalized Philippine-U.S. Security Relations,” pp. 977-78. 
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Republic of China appeared to be in the beginning of a naval arms build-up in the 
South China Sea felt the need to reassure other Asian nations of U.S. security 
commitment to the region.   
B. REINVOGRATED U.S.-PHILIPPINE RELATIONSHIP  
Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s declaration of support to 
the U.S. anti-terrorism campaign in September, 2001 appears to have been the 
key to solving this dilemma as it unlocked the door through which U.S. military 
assistance and equipment could once again flow into the Philippines.6  
Immediately following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the two 
nations signed an interim arrangement that gave the United States access to 
storing military weapons and supplies in the Philippines, the right to permanent 
over-flight, and approval to build temporary camps for U.S. troops in support of 
the Global War on Terror.  This agreement was key to U.S. efforts to upgrade 
American military links in Southeast Asia in order to prevent the region from 
becoming a new safe haven for international terrorists. 
Michael Montesano in his article “The Philippines in 2002” argues that the 
renewed Philippine-American military ties seem to reflect long-term U.S. 
priorities.  He stresses that three issues shaped Philippine affairs in 2002: 
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo's eligibility to contest the 2004 election, ever-
greater government revenue shortfalls, and American determination to use the 
country as a venue for strategic posturing in Southeast Asia.7  His argument is 
supported by a meeting between President Arroyo and President Bush in 2003. 
In this meeting President Arroyo stressed the determination of the Philippine 
government to move forward on an ambitious program of military reform, 
including increased allocation of resources to Philippine national defense.  In 
turn, President Bush committed to assist the Philippines in this effort. 
Additionally, the two Presidents agreed that their respective defense 
 
6 Renato Cruz De Castro, “The Revitalized Philippine-U.S. Security Relations,” pp. 980-82. 
7 Michael J. Montesano. “The Philippines in 2002,” Asian Survey. Vol. 43, Issue 1. (Jan-Feb, 
2003): pp.154-55.  
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establishments committed to embark on a multi-year plan to implement the key 
recommendations of the Joint Defense Assessment.8
In 2003, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld outlined the Pentagon’s 
plans for the realignment and transformation of U.S. forces in East Asia.  This 
change in force structure was deemed necessary in order to address the 
emerging new security threats of the region.  This realignment will distribute U.S. 
military power across the region to provide a quick response to both current and 
emerging threats, specifically the terrorist threat.  In 2004 the National Security 
Strategy (NSS) established homeland security as the first priority of the Nation, 
with the U.S. armed forces being tasked to provide an active, layered defense, 
both at home and abroad.  Southeast Asia currently contains areas that serve as 
breeding grounds for threats to U.S. interests.  These new security challenges 
will be addressed by the proposed realignment and transformation of U.S. forces 
in Northeast Asia, the objectives of which are threefold: creation of a global anti-
terrorism environment; providing a forward posture and presence; lastly, 
promoting regional security.9  One result of the realignment of U.S. forces will be 
the requirement for access to new training areas for U.S. force sustainment.  This 
thesis will discuss why the Philippines can fulfill the needs of U.S. force 
sustainment due to its strategic geography, favorable historical precedents, as 
well as a government that is amenable to an increased U.S. presence. 
There are several sources which provide credence to this supposition.  In 
“The Revitalized Philippine-U.S. Security Relations: A Ghost from the Cold War 
or an Alliance for the 21st Century?” De Castro contends that the Philippine-U.S. 
post-9/11 security relationship is characterized by temporary and limited 
American troop deployments aimed at developing the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines' counterterrorism capability and fostering interoperability between the 
Philippine and American armed forces.  He concludes that the post-9/11 alliance 
is significantly different from the two countries' security relationship during the 
 
8 Anonymous. “Joint Statement Between the United States of America and the Republic of 
the Philippines.” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents. Vol.39, Issue. 43. Washington, 
(2003): p.1.  
9 The National Military Strategy of the United States of America (2004), pp.19-20.  
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Cold War.10   Bryan Leifer also addresses one application of the revitalized U.S.-
Philippine security relationship in his article “Terrorist organizations in Southeast 
Asia: Islamic Nationalism, a Unifying Theme.”  In it, he addresses successes of 
the 2002 U.S.-Philippine bilateral actions against the Abu Sayaaf Group in the 
Southern Philippines.11
C. IMPLICATIONS OF INCREASED U.S. ACCESS 
The resumption of regular U.S. deployments to the Philippines, coupled 
with the proposed realignment of U.S. Forces in Northeast Asia, has sparked 
various levels of criticism from not only within the Philippines but from China and 
ASEAN member states as well.  In fact, some analysts claim that the revived 
U.S.-Philippine alliance is nothing more than a return to neo-colonialism on the 
part of the United States.   Specifically, the renewed interest in Southeast Asia 
has everything to do with United States neo-conservative military and economic 
ambitions in East and Southeast Asia and nothing to do with either a real or 
perceived Islamic terrorist threat.12  In fact they argue that the foray by the United 
States into the Southern Philippines against the Abu Sayyaf was just a target of 
convenience. 
Jim Glassman, in his article “The ‘War on Terrorism’ Comes to Southeast 
Asia” argues that the clearly stated objective of United States neo-conservatives 
since before 9/11 is to restore military relations with key countries in Southeast 
Asia, such as the Philippines and Indonesia, while expanding regional defense 
alliances to include other countries (Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand).13   
Glassman contends that this strategy is not as altruistic as it appears.  This 
reinvigorated alliance has everything to do with United States neo-conservative 
military and economic ambitions in East and Southeast Asia, and little or nothing 
to do with real or imagined Islamic terrorist threats. He argues that United States 
 
10 De Castro. “The Revitalized Philippine-U.S. Security Relations,” pp.982-83.  
11 Bryan Leifer.  “Terrorist organizations in Southeast Asia: Islamic Nationalism, A Unifying 
Theme.”  The International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, (2004): pp.4-5.  
http://www.mafhoum.com/press7/206P4.htm.  Accessed 12 April 2006.  
12 Jim Glassman. “The ‘War on Terrorism’ Comes to Southeast Asia,” Journal of 
Contemporary Asia. Vol 35, Iss 1, (2005): p.1. 
13 Ibid., p.3. 
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economic interests and concerns about encroachment by China, along with ways 
in which internal instability in countries like Indonesia, might destabilize the 
region and United States ambitions for it.  Glassman contends that the 
Philippines in 2001, currently struggling against the ASG, provided the United 
States its first opportunity to test this new strategy.   
Shortly after 9/11, U.S. government officials announced that the ASG- who 
had been conducting kidnap for ransom operations in the southern Philippines- 
had links to al-Qaeda and would become a focus of United States global anti-
terrorism operations.  According to Glassman, the United States went to great 
lengths to build up this al-Qaeda link so as to portray ASG as a threat which 
required a massive deployment of military force to the region.  Against the 
backdrop of major political maneuvers in the late 1980s and 90s, including the 
People’s Power Revolution and the successful negotiations with the powerful 
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the appearance on the scene of ASG in 
the early 1990s was barely noticed by the international arena.  In a world where 
many different criminal and small-scale terrorist organizations operate on the 
fringe of insurgent groups, in this case on the fringe of the much larger MNLF 
and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the ASG was seen as little more than a 
group of bandits.  In fact, Philippine President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo made a 
public statement portraying the ASG as "a money-crazed gang of criminals" prior 
to 9/11.14  Members of the Philippine Left also downplayed the ASG’s importance 
by purporting that the ASG was created by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 
in collusion with Philippine intelligence, formed to further fractionalize and 
undermine the Moro insurgency.15
Glassman continues his criticism by stating that the extension of the 
Global War on Terrorism to the Southern Philippines has been out of proportion 
to the actual threat of the insurgent forces in the region- and that the increase of 
 
14 Peace Mission Report. http://www.yonip.com/main/articles/Basilan%20Report.html. 
Accessed 12 April 2006. 
15 Statement of International Solidarity Mission website. 
http://www.pcusa.org/worldwide/philippines/philippines_article.pdf. Accessed 12 April 2006. 
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U.S. deployments has brought with it a 4000% increase in military expenditures16 
that encourage corruption at the highest levels of the Philippine government.17  
The most dramatic evidence of this came with the 2004 indictment of Major 
General Carlos Garcia, head comptroller of the AFP, for acquiring the equivalent 
of $2.5 million (pesos) over and above his legal income from 1993-2003.18  
Glassman also argues that the response to the supposed ASG threat has 
included joint military operations that have no clear purpose in relation to the 
terrorist threat and which conform instead to the imperatives of the pre-9/11 U.S. 
agenda for the Philippines.  
With a scheme reminiscent of a chapter from Machiavelli’s The Prince, 
Glassman purports that the expanded U.S. military operations in the Philippines 
against an imagined Islamic terror threat after 9/11 has simply provided a 
convenient scenario for the expansion of operations already stated as a policy 
objective across a wide array of Washington elites.  The fact that the U.S. military 
has publicly stated its desire for renewed access to the Philippines and to gain 
such access on the basis of the events of 9/11 is in part a function of the U.S. 
government's continued influence in Manila.19  Glassman argues that 
Washington’s strong influence is due to colonial and neo-colonial legacies, as 
well as the ongoing dependence of the Philippine elite and the marginal economy 
they control.20  9/11 provided Philippine elites, who have battled against 
widespread nationalist sentiment, the opportunity to sell their own collusion with 
the U.S. government as necessary in order to protect the national interest.  
Glassman feels that this was completely in line with the goal of U.S. elites, as 
9/11 provided the pretext for re-introduction of a neo-colonial presence.  
 
16 Glassman, p.3. 
17 Ibid., p.4. 
18 Temario C. Rivera. “The Philippines in 2004.” Asian Survey, Vol. XLV, No.1, (Jan/Feb 
2005): p.130. 
19 Glassman, p.10.  
20 The Philippine economy is highly dependent on foreign direct investment from the West, 
access to U.S. markets, and remittances from abroad.  In 2004, nearly 10 million Overseas 
Filipino Workers (OFWs) remitted $8.5 billion (compared to $506 million in FDI), equal to 10% of 
GDP and more than half the government budget. 
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Therefore, due to the U.S. government's continuing power and influence vis-à-vis 
its former colony, the United States can impose an increase in U.S. deployments 
to the Philippines in spite of substantial antagonism within the Philippines.  Of all 
arguments presented by Glassman, he believes this in particular makes the 
reinvigorated U.S.-Philippine alliance neo-colonial. 
Some criticize the increased presence of U.S. forces in the Philippines 
because of the alleged misconduct of some U.S. troops while in the country.  At 
the forefront of this debate was the December, 2005 indictment of four U.S. 
Marines for allegedly raping a Philippine woman following a bilateral exercise.  
This case revives memories of past abuses by U.S. forces stationed in Subic Bay 
who were shielded from local prosecution.  It also comes amid the proposed 
realignment of U.S. forces in Japan, where protests have often erupted, most 
notoriously over the 1995 rape of a minor by three U.S. servicemen. 
Still others criticize what role the Philippines is expected to play in the 
international agenda as they are now entangled in a reinvigorated alliance with 
the United States.  Despite general agreement on the importance of U.S.-
Philippine relations and the U.S.-led war on terrorism, bilateral frictions have 
occurred as the Philippines has become more assertive regarding its self-interest 
and sovereignty. In July 2004, President Arroyo withdrew Philippine forces from 
Iraq in response to the demands of Islamic militants who had kidnapped a 
Filipino contract worker, despite some criticism in the United States that the 
Philippines was “caving-in to terrorists.”21
The proposed realignment of U.S. forces in Northeast Asia has also 
brought about negative perceptions of U.S. global strategy from other nations in 
the region.  In particular, the Chinese government feels there is overwhelming 
evidence that the United States is focused on containing China.22  They feel that 
in pursuit of the strategy of containment, the United States is seeking both the 
 
21 Thomas Lum. “The Republic of the Philippines: Background and U.S. Relations,” 
Congressional Research Service, (January 10, 2006): p.1. 
22 Robert G. Sutter. Chinese Policy Priorities and Their Implications for the United States, 
(Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000): p.206. 
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creation of new, and the shoring up of old, alliances in the region.23  They also 
believe that the United States is bolstering Taiwan’s defenses against China’s 
growing military, creating a disparity in capabilities.24  The Japan-U.S. 
relationship is also troubling to the Chinese government as it views this as an 
opportunity for Japan to continue its militaristic trend.  Lastly, the tensions 
between the U.S. and China have also confronted the ten members of ASEAN 
with one of their biggest challenges since the end of the Cold War: the grouping 
could potentially face a damaging split if forced to choose between Beijing and 
Washington.25
D. MAJOR QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENT 
Four questions are at the core of this thesis: First, what events have led to 
a warming in political and military relations between the United States and the 
Philippines in the last 15 years?  Second, in the quest for new training 
opportunities in Southeast Asia, why should the U.S. focus on the Republic of the 
Philippines?   Third, what are the consequences of an increased U.S. presence 
in the Philippines?  Specifically, what responses can be expected from within the 
Philippines as well as regional neighbors, including China and the fellow member 
states of ASEAN?  
It is my argument that the United States should focus its training efforts in 
the Philippines for several reasons: first, the United States and the Philippines 
have a long history of security cooperation.  Second, recent warming trends in 
foreign relations have made an increased U.S. presence in the Philippines more 
palatable to the Filipinos.  Third, due to budget constraints the Philippine 
government has been unable to modernize its armed forces- which it must do in 
order to better cope with both internal and external threats to Philippines security.  
Forth, the Philippines’ geographic location is a key part of U.S. global strategy.  
 
23 Yong Deng. “Chinese Perceptions of U.S. Power and Strategy,” Asian Affairs, an 
American Review. Vol.28, Iss. 3 (Fall 2001). p.1.  
24 ADM William J. Fallon. US PACOM Commander testimony before House Armed Services 
Committee, 8 March 2005. < 
http://www.shaps.hawaii.edu/security/us/2005/20050308_fallon.html>. Accessed 12 March 2006. 
25 Oxford Research. ASEAN: US-China tensions affect South-east Asia. (June 28, 2001). 
10
Lastly, due to its large rural land mass, the Philippines has a plethora of quality 
ranges that could be used for required U.S. force sustainment in the region.  
There are four main chapters to this paper.  Chapter II will outline the 
historical U.S.-Philippines security relationship as well as identifying the cause of 
the recent warming trend in foreign relations between the two nations, post base 
closure. Chapter III will examine why the proposed U.S. force realignment in the 
Pacific requires the pursuit of new training areas in Southeast Asia.  This chapter 
will also examine why increased U.S. access to training opportunities in the 
Philippines will deepen military-military relations between the U.S. and 
Philippines, while also increasing the capabilities and interoperability of the AFP.  
Included will be a case study of Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines.  
Chapter IV will identify those fears generated by an increased U.S. presence in 
the area (internal to the Philippines, China, and ASEAN).  It will also examine 
ways to mitigate these fears by outlining the positive associations and reactions 
that can result from an increased presence.  The final chapter will provide 
recommendations for whether or not a shift in current U.S. policy is required.  
The end state of this study is to identify a possible road map which will may lead 
to increased access to training opportunities in Southeast Asia, and specifically 

















                                           
II. EBBS AND FLOWS OF THE UNITED STATES-PHILIPPINE 
SECURITY ALLIANCE 
The goal of this chapter is to identify the ebbs and flows of the United 
States and the Republic of the Philippines security alliance over the past 15 
years, as well as what each country hopes to gain from recent warming trends.  
Relations between the United States and the Philippines began a steady decline 
following the 1991 decision of the Philippine Senate to deny the renewal of the 
1947 Military Bases agreement.  However, over the next few years numerous 
independent events would lead to a warming of relations between the two 
countries.  Examples include the failure of Philippine military modernization 
programs as well as the 1995 discovery of an apparent Chinese encroachment 
on the Spratly Islands, which the Philippines claimed as sovereign soil.  The 
interaction of these two events precipitated a gradual warming trend in foreign 
relations between the two nations, ultimately leading to a dramatic increase in 
United States economic and military assistance to the Philippines. 
A. HISTORY OF U.S.-PHILIPPINE SECURITY TIES 
United States and Philippine relations go back as far as 1898 when U.S. 
and Filipino troops collaborated against Spain during the Spanish-American War.  
Upon conclusion of hostilities, the Treaty of Paris granted the United States 
colonial authority over the Philippine archipelago.26  Domestic opposition made 
the United States a reluctant colonial power as many Americans viewed 
imperialism as contrary to national values.  Despite this, the United States felt 
compelled to accept the Philippines as a colony for two reasons: first, the United 
States did not want to hand the archipelago back over to the Spanish; and 
second, that the United States was also reluctant to leave the door open for the 
Japanese.  Ultimately, the United States considered the Philippines to be 
strategically important to its interests in the Asia-Pacific region as it had a great 
potential in servicing the United States’ growing commercial and naval needs.27   
 
26 Garel Grunder and William Livezey. The Philippines and the United States. (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1951): p.36. 
27 Ibid., p.37. 
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From the outset the United States stated that its policy was to slowly 
groom the Philippines for eventual self-rule.  The United States set up a colonial 
government that instituted provincial governors and a national legislature28.  With 
the passing of the Tydings-McDuffie Law, the Commonwealth Government of the 
Philippines was established on 15 November, 1935, with Manuel L. Quezon as 
the first president.  The Commonwealth provided the Philippines a ten-year 
transition period before the assumption of full independence post-World War II in 
194529.  One of the government’s first proclamations was the Commonwealth Act 
No.1, otherwise known as the National Defense Act of the Philippines.  This Act 
mandated the creation of a defense system supported by a citizen army of 
10,000 active and 400,000 reserve personnel.30  It also intended to establish 
both a Philippine Navy (PN) and an Air Force (PAF), but the onset of World War 
II and the subsequent establishment of a Japanese puppet government 
prevented this from occurring.31
Eventually, the Japanese were overcome and the Philippines were 
liberated by the combined efforts of the Philippine resistance and the U.S. Armed 
Forces in the Far East led by General Douglas MacArthur.  On July 4, 1946, the 
United States formally declared the independence of the Philippines.32  On that 
same day the Republic of the Philippines and the United States signed two 
agreements that would provide the basis for all future Philippine-American 
relations: the 1946 Philippine-American Treaty on General Relations and the 
1946 Philippine American Trade Act.  Within eight months two more agreements 
were signed: on 14 March 1947 the Philippine-American Military Bases 
Agreement (MBA) and on 21 March 1947 the Philippine-American Assistance 
Pact.  These agreements strengthened American economic and security 
 
28 D.R. SarDesai. Southeast Asia, Past and Present.  Fifth edition. (California: Westview 
Press, 2003): p.161. 
29 Grunder, p.237 
30. Rommel C. Banlaoi. “The Role of Philippine-American Relations in the Global Campaign 
against Terrorism: Implications for Regional Security”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol 24, 
Num.2, (August 2002): p.297. 
31 Ibid., p.298. 
32 Grunder, p.253. 
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interests in the Asia-Pacific region by allowing the establishment of Subic Bay 
Naval Base in Olongapo and Clark Air Base in Pampanga as well as 21 other 
bases33.  These bases would soon become instrumental to American Cold War 
strategy, especially during the Korean and Vietnam Wars. 
In 1951 the United States and the Republic of the Philippines signed the 
Mutual Defense Treaty, where each country agreed to the concept of collective 
defense of their two nations.  This treaty recognized that “an armed attack in the 
Pacific Area on either of the parties would be dangerous to [both of their] peace 
and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in 
accordance [within their] constitutional processes.”34  The United States, with its 
great security umbrella, agreed to protect the Philippines from any major 
strategic threat in the region.  With its external security assured, the Armed 
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) was then able to focus solely on the internal 
security functions of counterinsurgency and civic actions.  To assist the AFP, the 
United States provided military assistance in the form of both loans and grants 
which accounted for an estimated 90% of the AFP’s annual budget for operations 
and maintenance35.   
From 1946 to present day, the Philippine military has had to face 
numerous internal security problems, mostly due to insurgencies.  The 
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) led an armed insurgency from the 
1940s through the 1950s.  This group morphed into a reformed communist party 
in the late 1960s and its military wing, the New Peoples Army (NPA), has 
continually challenged the Philippine Government.36  In 1970 a Muslim 
secessionist movement developed in the Southern Philippines that would grow in 
size until it dominated the Philippine security agenda, continuing through the 
 
33 Banlaoi, p.298. 
34 See Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty.  http://www.dfa.gov.ph/vfa/frame/frmmdt.htm. 
Accessed 12 April 2006. 
35 De Castro. “Adjusting to the Post-U.S. Bases Era,” p.122. 
36 Eva-Lotta Hedmann and John Sidel. Philippine Politics and Society in the Twentieth 
Century: Colonial Legacies, post-colonial trajectories. (London: Routledge, 2000): pp.1-24. 
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present day.37  In 1972 President Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law in order 
to stabilize perceived domestic security issues, forcing the AFP to pull resources 
away from counterinsurgency to the development of tactics, techniques and 
procedures to enforce martial rule.38  Marital law officially ended in 1986 when 
President Marcos was overthrown by the People’s Power Revolution.  With the 
end of marital law, the AFP was able to once again focus on its insurgent threats.  
Perceiving its major threat to be internal and that its external security was secure 
under the protections provided by the vast U.S. security umbrella, the new 
Philippine government directed all of its military resources solely towards 
domestic issues.39   
However, shortly after coming to power, Marcos’ successor, President 
Corazon Aquino, found the readiness of the AFP inferior to its ASEAN 
counterparts and that it was also ill-equipped to contain even its own domestic 
security threats.40  As the AFP had been focusing only on internal threats for 
over four decades, the Philippine Army was only equipped to support its primary 
mission of counterinsurgency: major items (mostly of U.S. origin) included 41 
light tanks, 85 armored infantry fighting vehicles, 285 armored personnel carriers, 
and assorted light and medium towed artillery.  The Philippine Navy was made 
up all former U.S. ships, most of World War II vintage.  In late 1989, the navy 
maintained only three frigates and eleven corvettes, none with missiles.  As the 
Philippine Navy’s mission was to protect and police the nation's 7,100 islands 
(with a combined coastline of 36,289 kilometers), the fleet consisted of mainly 
patrol boats, including twelve coastal and thirty-nine inshore patrol craft.  The 
PAF air force inventory in 1990 included only two squadrons of F-5 Freedom 
Fighters (fifteen combat aircraft).  Counterinsurgency operations were supported  
 
 
37 Rizal G. Buendia. “The Mindanao Conflict in the Philippines: Ethno-religious War or 
Economic Conflict?” in The Politics of Death. Aurel Croissant, Sascha Kneip, and Beate Martin, 
eds. (forthcoming): pp. 1-7. 
38 Mark Thompson. The Anti-Marcos Struggle: Personalistic Rule and Democratic Transition 
in the Philippines. (New Haven: Yale University Press,1995): pp. 54-55. 
39 Ibid. p.158. 
40 De Castro. “Adjusting to the Post-U.S. Bases Era,” p.121. 
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by a squadron of eight T-28D Trojan propeller-driven trainer/attack airplanes, as 
well as fifty-five Bell UH-1H/Iroquois transport helicopters and sixteen AUH-76 
attack helicopters41.   
Despite the huge gaps in military capability as compared to its ASEAN 
partners, the Aquino administration was reluctant to invest in the AFP due to two 
reasons: Aquino had both risen to power because of a military mutiny while also 
suffering six separate coup attempts by right-wing military rebels.  Additionally, 
public distrust of the military over its involvement during the martial law era 
coupled with a poor economy also made any attempts at AFP modernization 
unlikely.42  Therefore, although the Philippine government was aware of the need 
for some sort of modernization plan to address the dismal state of the PN and 
PAF, it remained unwilling to invest in modernization of the AFP as it could still 
rely on funding from the United States to keep its antiquated equipment 
functioning.   
B.  BREAKDOWN IN U.S.-PHILIPPINE COLD WAR ALLIANCE 
With the conclusion of the 1988 base review, followed closely with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States began to reassess its overall 
security strategy in the Pacific.43  The post-Soviet era now had new, smaller 
threats that required less U.S. military power: risks to oil supplies, maritime 
interdiction, regional hegemons, and territorial disputes.  This assessment 
translated into the planned reduction of forward-deployed forces and a reduced 
need for overseas bases.  The new strategy called for setting up smaller bases, 
establishing more bilateral and multilateral defense treaties, conducting joint or 




41 Library of Congress Country Studies website. http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/phtoc.html.  
Accessed 4 Apr 2006. 
42 De Castro. “Adjusting to the Post-U.S. Bases Era,” pp.121-125. 
43 George Schultz, and Raul Manglapus. “U.S.-Philippines Military Bases Agreement 
Review,” 1988. Department of State Bulletin. (Dec 1988): p.24. 
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to project a forward-presence44.  Thus, American strategic planners were now 
seriously considering options which did not require U.S. reliance on its Philippine 
bases.   
In Manila, the Aquino government was adopting a point of view that 
Philippine-U.S. security relations were nothing more than a commercial 
transaction which required compensation from the United States, as the 
Philippines was hosting the bases.45  Philippine defense planners saw no 
credible external threat to the country for the next five years and therefore saw 
little value in the U.S. security umbrella.  The Philippine government’s official 
position on the U.S. bases was: “… the Philippines faced no external enemies or 
threats, and that threats arising from both communist insurgency and the right-
wing military rebels could not be addressed by U.S. military presence in the 
country.”46  To many of those in the Aquino administration as well as the majority 
of the Philippine citizens, the most important value of the U.S. bases was their 
economic impact on the community.47
In 1990 the Philippine and U.S. governments entered into a series of 
negotiations aimed at discussing the future of the Philippine bases, the nature of 
U.S.-Philippine relations, and ultimately a new bases treaty.  A new accord was 
drafted after almost a year of talks called the “Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, 
and Security,” or “Pact of 1991”.48  The Pact was similar to the treaties signed in 
1947 with the exception of a slow phasing out of the U.S. presence in the country 
over a ten year period, with the possibility of an extension.  When it went to the 
Philippine Senate for ratification on September 16, 1991, it was voted down by a 
vote of 12 to 11.  The majority of senators were upset for two reasons: the 
relatively low base-related compensation of $203 million (all amounts in USD) for 
 
44 De Castro. “The Revitalized Philippine-U.S. Security Relations,” p.973. 
45 Robert Reid and Eileen Guerrero. Corazon Aquino and the Brushfire Revolution. (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995): p. 201. 
46 De Castro. “The Revitalized Philippine-U.S. Security Relations,” p.974. 
47 Renato Cruz De Castro. “Philippine Defense Policy in the 21st Century: Autonomous 
Defense or Back to the Alliance?” Pacific Affairs. Vol 78. (Fall 2005): p.408. 
48 De Castro. “The Revitalized Philippine-U.S. Security Relations,” Multiple references, p. 
975. 
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the American use of Subic Naval Base, as well as the ten year plan instead of a 
7 year withdrawal with no possibility of extension.  With no extension offered, the 
Americans now had to vacate the Philippines.  The Aquino government offered a 
three year phased-out withdrawal, but the United States opted to pull out within 
one year’s time.  When the last U.S. Marine departed Subic Bay in 1992, it 
marked the end of almost 100 years of continuous U.S. military presence in the 
Philippines.   
The only legal framework remaining to guide the Philippine-American 
post-base closure security relationship was the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951.  
To ease the obviously strained relations, both countries opted to keep the treaty 
in force with no amendments, as well as maintaining the quarterly Mutual 
Defense Board for consultation on mutual security concerns.  Additionally, the 
annual exercise “Balikatan”, translated as “Shoulder to Shoulder,” was allowed to 
continue.49  In November of 1992 the U.S. significantly downgraded its political 
and military relations with the Philippines when it declared that it could no longer 
guarantee the external defense of the Philippines since it had lost facilities from 
which to operate.  U.S. security relations with the Philippines would now fall only 
under the general heading of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN)50.  This declaration was important for two reasons: first, the Philippines 
was now solely responsible for its own external security, and perhaps more 
significant, the United States withdrew most of its military assistance to the 
AFP.51
The loss of 90% of its operations and maintenance budget due to the U.S. 
pullout in 1992 (roughly $200 million annually) virtually guaranteed that the AFP’s 
mostly Vietnam Era military equipment would degrade even further unless the 
 
49 Kane Walsh. “Balikatan 2000: Renewing U.S.-Philippines Military Engagement.” Asia-
Pacific Defense Forum, (Summer 2000): pp. 6-22. 
50 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs 
of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings. “Implications of the U.S. Withdrawal from Clark 
and Subic Bases.” 102nd Congress. Second Session. 1992. p.35. 
51 De Castro.  “Adjusting to the Post-U.S. Bases Era,” p.122. 
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Philippine government undertook a drastic modernization effort.52  Faced with no 
alternative, in 1991 the Philippine government ordered the AFP to prepare a ten-
year modernization program aimed at shifting defense priorities from internal to 
external threats, with the priority being given to the Philippine Navy.  The 
Philippine Navy was solely responsible for naval deterrence and enforcing sea 
control not only inside Philippine territorial waters, but out to the 200 nautical mile 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) as well.53  The Philippine government’s 
emphasis on naval development was necessary since it was aimed at preventing 
illegal fishing, poaching, and smuggling, which the government felt cost $1 billion 
in lost revenues annually54.  It also had another unstated goal- to protect the 
Philippine claim to a portion of the Spratly Islands, to which the United States 
disagreed with55.  Unfortunately, due to bureaucratic gridlock, all attempts at the 
modernization of the military and the strengthening of the country’s defense 
posture were stymied as the Philippine government stated any law pertaining to 
such would be dependent on the revitalization of the country’s economy and the 
attainment of national competitiveness.  Additionally, in the event the economic 
goals were achieved, the funds for modernization would only be released by the 
Senate if the AFP met the following objectives: a) if it became the lead disaster 
agency for the country, and b) if it took a more active part in environmental 
protection.56
In addition to the failed Senate attempts to fund AFP modernization, 
Philippine-U.S. diplomatic relations were also in gridlock over the next few years 
due to inability from both sides to negotiate on a variety of issues ranging from 
bilateral relations to acquisitions and cross-servicing agreements.  Explanations 
for the impasses were due to domestic Philippine fears of a possible U.S. return 
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while the United States had uncertainty with dealing a government that had 
questionable U.S. foreign policy motives.57  When President Ramos declined to 
enter into a Status of Forces Agreement with the United States in 1996, both 
countries opted to suspend all large-scale exercises, including Balikatan, pending 
ratification of some agreement on the legal status of visiting U.S. forces.58  As a 
result, U.S.-Philippine relations had now entered their lowest point since the base 
closures- with little to no attempts at interaction from either country to remedy the 
situation.  
C. REPAIRING THE DAMAGED ALLIANCE 
A very interesting and unexpected event would soon reverse the negative 
views concerning both the proposed AFP modernization as well as security 
relations with the United States.  In January 1995, a Filipino fishing vessel 
discovered the presence of Chinese naval units off of Mischief Reef, which was 
160 miles from the Philippines’ westernmost province of Palawan.59  Defense 
officials soon verified that the People's Republic of China was discovered to have 
built “shelters” for fishermen on a portion of the Spratly Islands.  The Philippine 
government claimed that the Chinese “shelters” were in fact naval support 
installations.60  This discovery led credence to the AFP’s forgotten claims as to 
the importance of an external defense capability.  As a result of the onslaught of 
public hysteria over the Spratly Islands situation, the Senate unanimously 
approved “An Act Providing for the Modernization of the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines and for other Purposes” also known as the “Republic Act 7898,” on 
23 February, 1995.61  Finally, after three long years and many failed attempts, 
the AFP now had approval to fund its modernization. 
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Accessed 16 Jan 2006. 
61 Government of the Philippines website. http://www.gppb.gov.ph/laws_rules/laws_ra.htm. 
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The Republic Act 7898 provided for a 15-year modernization program 
which provided for the creation of a sufficient naval capability to secure the 
nation’s borders from all kinds of maritime intrusions (such as piracy, poaching, 
smuggling, and drug trafficking), while also developing a capability for inshore 
and offshore patrol, surface warfare, detection and maritime surveillance62.  
However, the Congress still had the ability to determine the program’s objectives 
and funding needs, creating important leverage over the program.  After a delay 
of almost a full year, the Philippine Congress set the modernization in motion 
when it allocated $412 million for 1997, well below the AFP’s original request of 
$847 million.  Although the Asian Financial crisis in 1997 would set the program 
back a few months over Philippine economic uncertainty, increased tensions with 
the Chinese over the Spratly Islands prompted the Senate to release 
modernization funds to the AFP63. 
The discovery of Chinese construction on Mischief Reef had also rudely 
awakened the Philippine government to recognize the country’s need for some 
sort of external security capability, as Philippine defense officials and security 
experts now considered Chinese expansion in the South China Sea as their main 
long term security threat.64  The Philippine government also came to the 
realization that it needed to readdress its policies regarding security relations with 
Washington, as a revitalized Philippine-U.S. security relationship was seen as 
key to soliciting additional U.S. support and funding for upgrading the AFP’s 
equipment.65    
The United States also viewed these events as cause for concern, as they 
indicated that the Peoples Republic of China appeared to be in the midst of a 
naval build up in order to secure its claim to the entire South China Sea.66  
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China’s military modernization and territorial disputes with other nations in the 
South China Sea also appeared to be threatening the balance of power in the 
region.  The United States felt that if it did not act this would undermine its 
position with the other ASEAN member nations, not to mention Japan and South 
Korea, since inaction would be interpreted as a weakening of the U.S. security 
commitment to them in favor of China.67  Thus, officials in both Manila and 
Washington agreed that a revival of a strategic U.S.-Philippine relationship was 
necessary.   
In short order the Philippine Senate ratified the Visiting Forces Agreement 
(VFA) in 1999.  Armed with this document, the United States and the Philippines 
now had the legal framework necessary for increased interaction between their 
militaries.  The VFA was important for several reasons: first, it facilitated the 
resumption of large scale military exercises between the two countries- exercises 
that would lead to more familiarity, cooperation, and interoperability between the 
U.S. and Philippine militaries as well as generally improving the overall bilateral 
security relationship.68  This would soon come to fruition as the annual bilateral 
U.S.-Philippine Balikatan exercise was resumed in February of 2000.  Second, it 
provided the political framework for the development and implementation of the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) modernization program under the tutelage 
of a robust U.S. military.  Last, and perhaps most important to the United States, 
the VFA also made it possible for the United States to pursue access to air and 
naval infrastructure in Luzon in case of a crisis in the region.   
With the legal basis for U.S. troops deployed to the Philippines assured, 
the United States resumed its Foreign Military Assistance Program as well as the 
Excess Defense Articles Program with the Philippine government.69  These 
programs were welcomed by the Philippines as much of the AFP military 
equipment was no longer functional.  The cessation of U.S. Military aid in the 
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1990s following the base closures had led to a rapid deterioration of AFP military 
equipment as much of it was dependent on U.S. made spare parts, logistical 
support and technical expertise.  By 2001, of 102 M113 armored personnel 
carriers belonging to the AFP, only 64 were mission capable.  Regarding aircraft, 
the Philippine Air Force (PAF) had only 18 mission capable helicopters, 5 F-5 A 
fighters, and one C-130 transport.  The Philippine Navy (PN) had perhaps the 
worst readiness, as it was now only capable of putting 18 WWII era vessels to 
sea to patrol the country’s vast maritime domain.  Additionally, as the Philippine 
arsenal was only capable of producing limited amounts of small caliber 
ammunition, the AFP had been forced to import artillery shells and the balance of 
its small arms requirements from Thailand during military operations against the 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in 2000.70
D. HARDENING THE ALLIANCE 
The World Changed on September 11, 2001.  We learned that a 
threat that gathers on the other side of the earth can strike our 
cities and kill our own citizens.  It’s an important lesson; one we can 
never forget.  Oceans no longer protect America from the dangers 
of the world.  We’re protected by daily vigilance at home.  And we 
will be protected by resolute and decisive action against threats 
abroad. 
 President George W. Bush; Sept 17, 200271
In response to the devastating terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the 
United States government called for the creation of a global coalition against 
international terrorism, to be known as “The Coalition of the Willing.”  The United 
States immediately began to develop plans which would take the fight to this new 
irregular enemy.  Philippine President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was quick to 
respond when she offered up the use of the Philippines to the coalition in its 
pursuit of international terrorists.  Her declaration was important as she not only 
offered Washington access to former U.S. bases in Subic Bay and Clark  in 
support of the Global War on Terror, but also that she agreed to intelligence 
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sharing with the United States. 72  Arroyo’s intent of diplomatic and political 
support to the United States was intended to reinvigorate the U.S.-Philippine 
alliance.  A longstanding ally via the Mutual Defense Treaty, the United States 
government had provided vast amounts of economic and military support to the 
Philippines over the past half-century.  Arroyo was motivated to seek increased 
U.S. financial assistance to the Philippines, as the Philippines was still recovering 
from the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis as well as a resurgence of a Muslim 
Separatist threat in Mindanao.73   
During the post-World War II period, the Philippines was considered the 
second most developed country in East Asia, after Japan.  However, over the 
last three decades, the Philippines had not experienced the same levels of 
economic development as its neighbors in Southeast Asia.74  Analysts state that 
the Philippine economy has been stifled due to many systemic problems, 
including: political corruption, bureaucratic incompetence and red tape, an 
entrenched economic oligarchy, crony capitalism, government deficit and foreign 
debt, a highly inequitable distribution of wealth, the constant emigration of its 
professionals, poor infrastructure, a high birth rate and violent crime.75   Located 
in the nation’s south, Mindanao, one of the poorest and most crisis-ridden 
regions in the Philippines, has also been home to separatist conflict for years.  
Out of all provinces in the Philippines, Mindanao has approximately 65% of its 
population below the poverty line, the lowest access to safe drinking water, the 
least access to electricity, toilet and health facilities of any other region.76   
The United States was eager to offer assistance to the Philippines as it 
was alarmed by suspected links between the Abu Sayyaf Group, a designated 
Foreign Terrorist Organization, and Al Qaeda as well as other Islamic Militants in 
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the Southern Philippines who appeared to be consolidating power in Mindanao.  
By November the two nations conducted a summit in Washington, where Bush 
and Arroyo reaffirmed their commitments to, and the continued validity of, the 
Mutual Defense Agreement of 1951.  Bush, in response to the offer of 
unequivocal Philippine support, offered the possibility of U.S. military involvement 
in the AFP campaign against the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Southern 
Philippines77.  President Arroyo declined the offer of manpower, and instead 
asked for new equipment and training for the AFP so that they would be better 
prepared to put down the rebel campaign.  The two leaders approved a cohesive 
training plan for the AFP, delivery of new equipment to enhance AFP mobility, as 
well as the creation of a new bilateral consultative mechanism.78   
By introducing both U.S. economic and military assistance to the 
Philippines in its fight against the Abu Sayyaf Group, both the Philippines and the 
United States came away with their agendas satisfied.  The Philippines once 
again had access to large amounts of economic and military assistance, as well 
as warm relations with a very powerful ally.  With the Philippines now designated 
a “front-line state” in the Global War on Terror, the United States significantly 
increased its foreign assistance to the country (see figure 1).79  This assistance 
was offered up in recognition of the Philippine Government’s acceptance of the 
Bush administrations wish to test its new strategy of security cooperation 
activities within the Philippines sovereign territory.  These new U.S. strategies 
were based on encouraging partner nations to develop, modernize and transform 
their own military capabilities.   
Given that the both the United States and the Philippines were satisfied 
with a re-kindled alliance,  the United States could now safely consider plans 
which would allow increased U.S. military access to valuable Philippine training 
areas.  The next chapter will focus on how this increased access to Philippine  
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 training areas would facilitate improvements in both the United States and 
Philippine militaries while simultaneously providing a stabilizing effect to crisis- 
ridden Mindanao.   
 
Figure 1. U.S. Assistance to Philippines, 2002-2006.80
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III. IMPORTANCE OF INCREASING UNITED STATES MILITARY 
ACCESS TO PHILIPPINE TRAINING AREAS  
Following a review of its force posture in 2001, the United States 
published a Quadrennial Defense Review which proposed the transformation of 
U.S. military forces around the globe.   This proposed transformation requires the 
United States to both seek out new and reinforce existing access and 
infrastructure agreements.  As the last chapter detailed, the reinvigorated U.S.-
Philippine security relationship opened the door for the United States to once 
again pursue a portion of its annual military training requirements within the 
Republic of the Philippines.  This chapter will identify how this increased access 
to Philippine training areas by U.S. forces has enhanced military to military 
relations between the United States and the Philippines, while simultaneously 
increasing the capabilities and interoperability of the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines.  This increase in capabilities was a direct result of a steadily 
increasing U.S. military presence in numerous annual Philippine exercises and 
operations since 2001.  Providing perhaps the best example of this was 
Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines in 2002.  Building on this success, the 
United States and the Philippines signed the Mutual Logistics Support 
Agreement in 2003, which facilitated an increased frequency of U.S. force 
deployments to the Philippines.   These deployments would not only continue to 
develop the professionalism of the AFP, but also provide a stabilizing effect to 
the region so as to encourage further economic and humanitarian assistance to 
crisis areas in the Philippines. 
A. 2001 QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW 
Within days of the Philippines pledge of support to the coalition, U.S. 
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld signed the 2001 Quadrennial Defense 
Review Report which included the Pentagon’s plans for the transformation of 
U.S. forces around the world.  The proposed transformation of U.S. forces was 
designed to accomplish several key objectives of the United States National 
Military Strategy: the creation of a global anti-terrorism environment; providing a 
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forward posture and presence; lastly, promoting regional security.81 The 
proposed change in force structure was also deemed necessary in order to 
address the newly emerged global security threats to the United States and its 
allies.82  Of particular interest was an apparent overseas “arc of instability” that 
stretches from the Western Hemisphere, through Africa and the Middle East to 
Asia.83  Inside this arc of instability were territories that provide sanctuary to 
enemies of the United States and its allies - territories that enable the terrorists a 
place of relative safety from which to prepare plans, train forces and launch 
attacks.    
Maintaining regional stability in Asia is a formidable task, due to several 
different but interrelated points.  First, the possibility exists that a military 
competitor with a large resource base could emerge in the region.  Second, the 
sheer size of the region presents an exceptionally challenging area for the United 
States to protect or patrol.  Third, that the density of U.S. basing and en-route 
infrastructure in Asia is lower than in other regions around the globe.  Related to 
this last point is that the United States has limited assurances of access to 
facilities in the region- which makes it particularly important to both seek out new 
and reinforce existing access and infrastructure agreements.  
In 2003, the United States proposed a shift of forces in Northeast Asia, 
with three main elements to the reorganization: first, the U.S. Second Division in 
South Korea will be relocated from the Demilitarized Zone to an area south of 
Seoul, where they will now become more readily available for immediate 
redeployment in case of a crisis.84  Second, air and naval forces in Guam will be 
increased:  proposed changes include the relocation of a carrier battle group 
from California as well as 8,000 Marines from the Third Marine Expeditionary 
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Force who are currently stationed on Okinawa.85  Third, new training areas and 
facilities are currently being sought in Thailand, the Philippines and Australia for 
sustainment of U.S. forces.86  There is, however, no intent for U.S. forces to be 
permanently based in any of these countries.   
The impact to the Philippines of this impending realignment comes mainly 
for the need for new training areas for those U.S. forces moved to Guam from 
Okinawa.  Guam, just like Okinawa, suffers from a lack of large training areas 
and those that it does possess are restricted.  These restrictions provide little 
opportunity for the training that is essential to maintaining combat readiness.87  
This scarcity in turn requires that U.S. combat units, whether stationed on 
Okinawa or Guam, must routinely deploy elsewhere in the Far East for such 
training.   Of those countries where the United States is seeking new training 
areas, the Philippines is the closest geographically.  This makes training in the 
Philippines advantageous as some units being relocated from Okinawa are 
capable of self-deploying to the Philippines.  For those that cannot, the High 
Speed Vessel (HSV) recently leased by the Marines is available. 88   
Overall, the proposed U.S. Northeast Asian realignment bodes well for the 
Philippines as it remains poised to accept more robust bilateral exercises- as the 
Philippine forces would benefit from any additional counter-terrorist training 
received from the United States.89  This training was urgently needed as the AFP 
was still struggling with a growing Muslim insurgent problem in Mindanao and the 
Sulu Archipelago.  
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B. THE ABU SAYYAF THREAT 
To date, the Philippine government has been struggling with insurgent 
groups of differing ideologies for over 4 decades.  In particular, the Muslim 
insurgency in the Southern Philippines had been extremely costly in terms of 
both men and equipment.90  Despite early Philippine attempts at resolution, the 
Muslim separatist movement had grown in strength over time, with different 
factions splitting off along the way (for an expanded discussion on the Moro 
Nationalist Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) 
please refer to Appendix I).  Of those groups who split off from the mainstream, 
perhaps the most violent Muslim separatist group operating in the region is the 
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), or “Bearer of the Sword”.  The group split from the 
much larger MNLF in the early 1990s with the intent of establishing an Islamic 
state based on Sharia law on the islands of Mindanao and the Sulu 
Archipelago.91   
The ASG rejected the non-violent practices adopted by the MNLF as the 
ASG prefers violent struggle, or “Jihad”, as its ideological strategy.  The ASG 
successfully competed with the MNLF for the leadership of the Moros’ national 
struggle, successfully taking advantage of a pre-existing Islamic trend within the 
MNLF.   During the 1970’s and 1980’s the Moros nationalist main-stream political 
force did nothing to inhibit the Islamists’ increased participation in the armed 
struggle against the Philippine government as they acknowledged the radicals’ 
contributions to the overall effort to drive the government to make political and 
territorial concessions.  In 1996 the ASG split away from the MNLF as they were 
bitterly opposed to the apparent concessions that were being introduced in the 
peace process between the Philippines and the MNLF.92   
Abubakar Janjalani, the son of a fisherman on Basilan Island, originally 
formed the Abu Sayyaf Group in the early 1990s.  While fighting against the 
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former Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s, Janjalani had become 
connected with a Muslim fundamentalist movement called the Al Islamic Tabligh.  
Janjalani continued his studies in Saudi Arabia and Libya where he became 
radicalized.  When he returned to Basilan, he recruited two groups into the ASG: 
dissidents from the MNLF and as well as other Filipinos who had fought with the 
Afghan mujaheddin.   Janjalani led the ASG until December 1998, when he was 
killed by police in Lamitan village on Basilan.  After his death, his brother, 
Khaddafy Janjalani, emerged as the ASG’s new leader and appears to have 
consolidated power.93  Despite this change in leadership the ASG claim to an 
Islamic ideology with a focus on Jihad still guides their radical objectives and 
strategy.94  Although the ASG presents itself as a legitimate secessionist 
organization, the facts tell a different tale.   
Slowly refining their use of violence as a policy tool, the ASG have 
transformed into a credible terrorist organization.  In the early 1990s the ASG is 
reported to have received funding from Al Qaeda through Mohammad Jamal 
Khalifa, who was Osama bin Laden’s brother-in-law. Additionally, Ramzi Yousef, 
a known Al Qaeda operative, visited Basilan Island in 1995, where he reportedly 
trained 20 ASG members.  Following this visit, Yousef established an Al Qaeda 
cell in Manila where he planned several attacks including: an assassination of 
Pope John Paul II, the planting of bombs aboard 12 U.S. airliners flying trans-
Pacific routes, as well as a plan to crash an airplane into the Central Intelligence 
Agency’s headquarters in Langley, Virginia.  The plots were uncovered by the 
Philippine National Police in 1995.  Yousef was later arrested in Pakistan and 
extradited to the United States for trial over his complicity in the 1993 bombing of 
the World Trade Center.95
Ultimately, it was the ASG’s choice of sensational terrorist actions, like 
bombings and kidnappings of foreigners, that placed the ASG on the 
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international agenda, as well as adding their name to the U.S. government’s list 
of Foreign Terrorist Organizations in October, 1997.96  In April 1995 the ASG 
undertook its first large-scale action against the town of Ipil in Mindanao, which 
resulted in 53 deaths.  By the year 2000 the ASG began to use terror primarily for 
financial profit, engaging in kidnappings for ransom, bombings, beheadings, 
assassinations, and extortion.  In April of 2000, an ASG faction kidnapped 21 
persons, including 10 Western tourists, from a resort in Malaysia where they 
gained nearly $20 million USD in ransom from the governments of Malaysia, 
Libya, Germany and France.97  It was these events as well as the group’s ties to 
Al Qaeda that would draw increased scrutiny from the United States. 
C. OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM-PHILIPPINES 
Following the 9/11 terror attacks, Philippine President Gloria Macapagal 
Arroyo quickly offered up the use of the former U.S. bases, Subic Bay Naval 
Base and Clark Air base to the United States, stating that the Philippines was 
“ready to pay a price” to support the GWOT.  Concurrently, she issued a 14-
stage counterterrorism campaign to enhance intelligence sharing with the U.S. 
and other coalition members98.  President Bush, in response to the offer of 
unequivocal Philippine support, offered the possibility of U.S. military involvement 
in the AFP campaign against the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Southern 
Philippines99.  Prior to 9/11, Philippine government policy had been to apply 
military pressure to the Abu Sayyaf Group who, on May 27, 2001, had kidnapped 
three U.S. citizens and 17 Filipinos from a tourist resort in Palawan, Philippines.  
Several of the hostages, including one U.S. citizen, were murdered.  However, 
AFP attempts to rescue the hostages had been ineffective due to several factors: 
difficult terrain, inadequate Philippine equipment, avoiding clashes with the MNLF 
and the MILF, as well as relatively high instances of corruption in the AFP.100
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In Nov 2001, the two nations signed an interim arrangement that gave the 
United States access to storing military weapons and supplies in the Philippines, 
the right to permanent over-flight, and approval to build temporary camps for U.S. 
troops in support of the GWOT.101  These moves were seen by the United States 
as key to upgrading American military links in Southeast Asia in order to prevent 
the region from becoming a new safe haven for international terrorists, thereby 
denying Al Qaeda a new home base and access to human and material 
resources.  The United States and the Philippines also approved a cohesive 
training plan for the AFP, delivery of new equipment to enhance AFP mobility, as 
well as the creation of a new bilateral consultative mechanism.  After 9/11, the 
Philippines received a ten-fold increase in U.S. military assistance, from $1.9 
million USD in 2001, to $19 million in 2002.  The large list of new equipment 
provided by the Foreign Military Funding program included a C-130B Hercules 
transport aircraft, eight UH-1H Iroquois helicopters, 30,000 M-16s, grenade 
launchers, mortars, sniper rifles, night vision and thermal imaging devices, as 
well as a 360-ton Cyclone class coastal patrol craft.102  New U.S. security 
assistance also included the training of anti-terrorism Light Reaction Companies 
of the AFP, as well as other programs designed to enhance overall AFP 
capabilities.103
The United States and the Philippines also authorized the participation of 
over 4000 U.S. troops on Luzon in the annual bilateral exercise Balikatan 
(translated “Shoulder to Shoulder”).   Under the framework of Balikatan an 
additional deployment of almost 1,300 troops, including 160 U.S. Special Forces 
personnel (SOF), were deployed to the Southern Philippine island of Basilan to 
aid the AFP in its operations against the Abu Sayyaf.  The U.S. Special Forces 
personnel were given the mission of advising, training and assisting the AFP on 
counterterrorism operations, with the other troops in a support role: building 
infrastructure to support the operation, including road projects, digging wells, and 
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providing economic and humanitarian assistance to the local population.  This 
deployment was to be known as Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-
P).104   
In keeping with the 2001 QDR, the U.S. goal of OEF-P was to promote the 
development of professional armed forces in the area, while holding firm to the 
notion that the U.S. would only maintain temporary bases instead of a permanent 
forward deployed force105.  Unlike previous Cold War strategy, where the United 
States maintained a forward deployed force to ensure security of major Asian air 
and sea lanes, this deployment was to encourage and assist governments in 
neutralizing terrorist organizations that threatened their own countries and global 
security.   A secondary goal was to better prepare the AFP for providing 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, as well as aiding in future United 
Nations Peacekeeping missions.  During OEF-P, U.S. troops deployed to the 
Southern Philippines were relegated to a purely supporting role: they were 
allowed to patrol with the AFP but they could not engage in combat, as they were 
instructed to merely observe and assess the performance of their Filipino 
counterparts.106  To complement the U.S. ground force presence, the United 
States also made some of its national signals intelligence (SIGINT) assets 
available to the operation.  
One of the best examples of U.S. intelligence and operational support to 
the AFP came in late June, 2002, when a Philippine Marine patrol boat, equipped 
with night-vision goggles and guided by U.S. intelligence assets, was able to 
ambush one of the senior ASG leaders.  Abu Sabaya, spokesman for the ASG, 
had been under surveillance for weeks prior to the operation as U.S. Special 
Forces had surreptitiously installed a transponder in the foam padding of his 
backpack.  The United States also provided airborne terminal guidance during 
the ambush by pointing a laser at the rebel boat, thereby allowing the Philippine 
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Marines to track it with their night-vision goggles.  After the Philippine Marines 
intercepted the boat in the open ocean, a brief firefight erupted which resulted in 
the death of Sabaya and the capture of several other ASG members.107   
U.S. intelligence assets did suffer limitations in their employment during 
the unconventional aspects of the operation.  In fact, the rules of engagement led 
directly to an over-reliance on U.S. technical reconnaissance assets.  Unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAVs) and a P3 Orion were provided by the United States to 
locate the ASG and the hostages on Basilan.  The rationale for technical 
reconnaissance assets was force protection as their employment would minimize 
risks to U.S. personnel who were precluded from patrolling with their AFP 
counterparts.  According to the SOF commander, the use of these platforms did 
reduce patrolling in remote areas, but the UAV surveillance was extremely 
conventional as it only serviced specific named areas of interest (NAI).  The NAIs 
supported the higher headquarters’ (the joint task force level) priority intelligence 
requirements, but due to long lag times in the dissemination of this information 
the AFP and SOF forces on the ground were unable to exploit the available 
reconnaissance assets.108  Gracia Burnham, the surviving American hostage, 
described the ineffectiveness of the airborne intelligence assets in her memoir: 
"[We] heard a spy plane circling overhead, [but our captors] ignored them 
because they had been circling for months and nothing ever happened." 109  
Ultimately, mostly due to AFP over-reliance on conventional search and 
destroy missions in the jungles of Basilan, the operation was a mixed success.  
During a AFP hostage recovery operation on June 7, 2002, U.S. hostage Gracia 
Burnham was rescued, but her husband Martin Burnham and Filipina Deborah 
Yap were killed110.  The ASG, although it suffered large losses of manpower and 
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material, was not eliminated as it shifted its base of operations to Mindanao111.  
However, the operation was successful in that United States was able to 
increase the AFP’s overall combat capabilities.   
Arguably, the biggest gains of OEF-P appear to be political rather than 
military.  OEF-P successfully strengthened domestic political support for a 
revitalized U.S.-Philippine alliance as it enhanced the Philippine government’s 
programs of social reform and poverty alleviation in some of the poorest parts of 
the nation.  The infrastructure left behind, in the form of new roads, bridges, and 
water projects, would provide lasting proof that the Philippine government was 
indeed committed to improving the lives of its citizens.  Prior to 2002, the ASG 
had successfully put a strangle-hold on the island until the U.S.-Philippine 
bilateral response was able to break it.  Non-governmental organizations had left 
stockpiles of medicine, building materials and bridges on the island that could not 
be delivered to the population due to fear.  The combined military and 
humanitarian assistance to the island successfully freed the inhabitants of the 
ASG’s reign of terror, forcing the group to go elsewhere.  On a grander scale the 
operation led to further U.S. commitments to the Philippines in the form of $4.6 
billion worth of continued economic and military assistance.  The Philippines 
used these funds to continue the implementation of its modernization programs 
for the AFP, thereby making the AFP more capable of handing the country’s 
internal security problems.112
D. MUTUAL LOGISTICS SUPPORT AGREEMENT 
Following closely behind the successes of the bilateral operations against 
the ASG, the United States and the Philippine signed the Military Logistics 
Support Arrangement (MLSA) on November 22, 2002.113  The five year MLSA 
year arrangement is important for three reasons:  first, it provides the 
administrative structure required for logistical support between the AFP and the 
U.S. military in both peacetime and conflict.  The MLSA also sets the legal and 
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logistic framework between the two nations for reciprocal logistic supplies and 
services during combined, peacekeeping or other multilateral operations.  
Second, the MLSA lowers the cost of the security cooperation by minimizing the 
administrative burdens of preparing interoperability and operational strategies for 
future emergencies.  Last, and perhaps most important, this agreement shows 
that both nations are committed to the implementation of a formal access 
arrangement for U.S. forces- something that many leftist organizations and 
nationalist individuals had been opposed to since the 1991 base closures.114
As discussed previously, despite the attrition of many of their forces by 
AFP operations, the threat from the Abu Sayyaf Group did not completely 
dissipate.  In fact, over the next few years their tactics have shifted to bombings, 
which may annotate a return to a more radical, politicized agenda.  After the 
2002 Balikatan operation, the ASG had a role in a roadside bombing outside a 
Philippine military base in Zamboanga in October of 2002 that killed a U.S. 
Special Forces serviceman.  Khaddafy Janjalani also established links with 
Jeemah Islamiah (JI), an Al Qaeda-affiliated group in Southeast Asia that had 
begun to use Mindanao for training and organizing terrorist strikes. In March and 
April 2003, Abu Sayyaf, JI, and MILF cadre carried out bombings in Davao on 
Mindanao, which killed 38.115  Janjalani also established links with Rajah 
Solaiman, a radical Muslim group made up of Filipinos from the northern 
Philippines who had converted to Islam. Together, these groups carried out 
major bombings after 2003, including bombings in metropolitan Manila as well as 
the Super-Ferry 14 bombing in Manila Bay, which killed approximately 194.  In 
March 2004, Philippine authorities arrested an ASG cell whose bombing targets 
included the U.S. Embassy in Manila116.  Because of the ASG shift in tactics, 
future exercises between the United States and the Philippines would remain 
focused on strengthening the counter-terrorism capabilities of the AFP.  AFP  
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operations were indeed achieving results, as the Abu Sayyaf’s armed strength is 
estimated to have fallen from 1,000 in 2002 to 200-400 in 2005.117
Now armed with the MLSA agreement, and with popular support firmly 
behind the interaction of the United States and the Philippine bilateral exercises, 
Balikatan and other annual exercises were allowed to continue- with counter-
terrorism training remaining the objective of each successive exercise (for a more 
thorough list of U.S.-Philippine exercises refer to Appendix II).118  During 
President Arroyo’s state visit to Washington in 2003, President Bush designated 
the Philippines a Major Non-NATO ally and also promised increased U.S. military 
assistance.119  In 2003, the United States and the Philippines attempted to 
launch a similar operation against the remaining Abu Sayyaf members in the 
Sulu Archipelago.  However, due to difficulties resolving the rules of engagement 
for U.S. forces as well as the question whether or not the Philippine Constitution 
allowed foreign troops to be exposed to combat, this operation was 
postponed.120   
In 2005, the United States once again committed forces to the region with 
the task of direct support missions for the Philippine military in western Mindanao 
against Abu Sayyaf, as well as non-combat missions on the Abu Sayyaf 
sanctuary of Jolo Island.  U.S. officials had expressed growing concern over the 
presence of JI on Mindanao as well as the presence of alleged links between JI 
and the MILF.  The Bush Administration hoped that supporting the ongoing 
peace talks between the Philippine government and the MILF it could break the 
MILF-JI ties.  However, coordination among Abu Sayyaf, JI, and elements of the 
MILF presented the possibility of a wider terrorist war in the Philippines.  For this  
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reason the United States opted not for combat operations but instead on 
continuing its support role of providing advice, training and assistance to the 
AFP.  
From 2001 to 2005, over 30 annual joint U.S.-Philippine military exercises 
occurred throughout the Philippines.  These exercises were all planned under the 
auspices of the Mutual Defense Board and Visiting Forces Agreement, and 
agreed upon by both governments. These exercises continued to provide 
valuable opportunities for training, humanitarian assistance projects, information-
sharing and other activities that benefit the national security interests of both the 
Philippines and the United States.  Exercise Balikatan 2006, to be held from 20 
Feb - 5 Mar 06, would be the most robust operation held since 2002.  The 
exercise was to be conducted in three phases: humanitarian and civic assistance 
on the island of Jolo in the Sulu archipelago, a combined task force staff exercise 
in Cebu and cross training and field training exercises in Luzon.  Approximately 
5,500 U.S. personnel and approximately 2,800 Armed Forces of the Philippines 
personnel participated in Exercise Balikatan 2006 throughout the Republic of the 
Philippines.  However, due to the rules of engagement and constitutional 
problems that arose in 2003, plans were made to keep U.S. forces away from 
any areas where combat with the ASG was likely. 
Just prior to the start of Balikatan 2006, a devastating mudslide destroyed 
the city of Guinsaugon, on the Southern Philippine island of Leyte.  Fortunately, 
as Balikatan was about to commence, a large U.S. force presence was in the 
area who was ready to provide support to the Philippine government. Within 
hours, more than 2,500 U.S. forces were diverted to assist in the search and 
rescue operation on Leyte.  The U.S. military role was to provide immediate, life-
sustaining support, in order to mitigate any additional loss of life or human 
suffering in the areas affected by the landslide.  The venue of Exercise Balikatan 
enabled the U.S. and Philippine governments to work closely together to 
coordinate an immediate humanitarian assistance/disaster relief response to this 
emergency.  
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During Balikatan 2006, under the Project Bayanihan – an initiative 
provided for in Mutual Defense Treaty, seven Medical Civic Action Programs 
(MEDCAPs), four Engineering Civic Action Projects (ENCAPs), a staff exercise, 
and military training were conducted jointly between the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines (AFP) and U.S. Military simultaneously on the Islands of Cebu, Luzon 
and Sulu.  Assisted by U.S. Military, the AFP was responsible for security 
throughout the exercise.  Success of the exercise included free medical and 
dental care to over 11,000 Filipinos, veterinary care for animals, as well as the 
construction a of four new school buildings.  As is the case of previous Balikatan 
exercises, all infrastructures built to support the operations would remain after 
the withdrawal of the U.S. forces.  In accordance with agreements made between 
the United States and the Philippine governments, Project Bayanihan and other 
humanitarian and civic action programs will continue in Mindanao.121
E. CONCLUSION 
As this chapter has shown, both U.S. military and economic assistance to 
the Philippines increased dramatically post-9/11.  By allowing U.S. forces access 
to training areas in the Philippines, military to military relations between the 
United States and the Philippines have increased tremendously, while 
simultaneously bolstering the counter-terrorism skills of the AFP.  Each country 
had it own reasons for rekindling this alliance.  The Philippines hoped that it 
would draw badly needed funds to complete the modernization of the AFP, while 
the United States found a willing ally in which to test out its new security 
cooperation strategies that were provided in the 2001 QDR.  Chapter four will 
discuss some of the implications this rekindled security relationship would have- 
from both inside the Philippines as well as outside the nation’s boundaries, 
including reactions from ASEAN partners and China.      
 
121 Tim Meyer. “Balikatan 2006 improves Filipino lives, RP-US ties,” U.S. Pacific Command 
Public Affairs. (March 6, 2006). 
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IV. PERCEPTIONS OF THE INCREASED U.S. PRESENCE IN 
THE PHILIPPINES 
As Chapter II and III detailed, several events increased the frequency of 
United States military deployments to the Republic of the Philippines after an 
almost 5 year hiatus.  The first event was the ratification of the Visiting Forces 
Agreement by the Philippines in 1998, and the second when Philippine President 
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo pledged her country’s support to the United States-led 
“Coalition of the Willing” in 2001.  Other important U.S. policy documents such as 
the 2001 QDR and the 2004 NMS also contributed to the large increase in 
annual joint exercises and operations between U.S. and Philippine forces on 
Philippine soil.122  The resumption of regular U.S. deployments to the Philippines, 
coupled with the proposed realignment of U.S. Forces in Northeast Asia, has 
sparked various levels of criticism from not only within the Philippines but from 
China and ASEAN member states as well.    
Some criticisms have come about due to the alleged misconduct of U.S. 
troops while in the country.  At the forefront of this debate was the December, 
2005 indictment of four U.S. Marines for allegedly raping a Philippine woman at 
the conclusion of a bilateral exercise.   Still others criticize what role the 
Philippines is expected to play in the international agenda as they are now 
entangled in a reinvigorated alliance with the United States.  Despite general 
agreement on the importance of U.S.-Philippine relations and the U.S.-led war on 
terrorism, bilateral frictions have occurred as the Philippines has become more 
assertive regarding its self-interest and sovereignty. In July 2004, President 
 
122 The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) outlined the Pentagon’s plans for the 
realignment and transformation of U.S. forces across the globe.  Recognizing the changes in the 
international situation in a Post Cold War era, the change in force structure was deemed 
necessary in order to address emerging security threats to both the U.S. and its allies.  In 2004 
the National Security Strategy (NSS) established homeland security as the first priority of the 
Nation, with the U.S. armed forces being tasked to provide an active, layered defense, both at 
home and abroad.  In the execution of the NSS, the first line of defense is abroad and includes 
mutually supporting activities with U.S. allies to counter threats close to their source.  The NMS is 
also supported by the proposed realignment and transformation of U.S. forces in Northeast Asia, 
of which the objectives are threefold: creation of a global anti-terrorism environment; providing a 
forward posture and presence; lastly, promoting regional security.  
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Arroyo withdrew Philippine forces from Iraq in response to the demands of 
Islamic militants who had kidnapped a Filipino contract worker, despite some 
criticism in the United States that the Philippines was “caving-in to terrorists.” 
Regionally, the increase in U.S. deployments to the Philippines and the 
proposed realignment of U.S. forces in Northeast Asia has also brought about 
negative perceptions of U.S. global strategy.  In particular, the Chinese feel there 
is overwhelming evidence that the United States is focused on a strategy of 
containing China.  In pursuit of this strategy, the United States is apparently 
seeking both the creation of new, and the shoring up of old, alliances in the 
region.123  The United States is also perceived to be bolstering Taiwan’s 
defenses against China’s growing military, creating a disparity in capabilities.  
The recent increase in U.S. deployments to the Philippines has also added fuel 
to this debate as the Chinese feel that this is an obvious attempt at establishing 
bases from which to mount a defense of Taiwan.  Additionally, the Japan-U.S. 
relationship is also troubling to the Chinese as they view this as an opportunity 
for Japan to continue its militaristic trend.  Lastly, the tensions between the U.S. 
and China have also confronted the ten members of ASEAN with one of their 
biggest challenges since the end of the Cold War: the grouping could potentially 
face a damaging split if forced to choose between Beijing and Washington.124
A. TESTING THE VFA: PHILIPPINE RAPE CASE 
On December 27, 2005, a Filipino prosecutor issued indictments against 
four U.S. Marines for allegedly raping a Filipino woman while in the Philippines 
during a training exercise.125  The case revives memories of past abuses by US 





123 Yong Deng. Chinese Perceptions of U.S. Power and Strategy. Asian Affairs, an American 
Review, Vol.28, Iss. 3 (Fall 2001): p.3.   
124 Oxford Research. ASEAN: US-China tensions affect South-east Asia. (Oxford: Jun 28, 
2001).  
125 Lum, p.15. 
43
                                           
comes amid a restructuring of U.S. forces in Japan, where tensions have often 
erupted, most notoriously over the 1995 rape of a minor by three U.S. 
servicemen.126
The indicted Marines, who are all stationed in Okinawa, have denied the 
charge. The Marines currently are in the custody of the U.S. Embassy in Manila.  
Philippine officials stress that the 1998 U.S.-Philippine Visiting Forces Agreement 
(VFA), has provisions to cover such cases.  The case could prove awkward for 
President Gloria Arroyo-Macapagal, who is also currently struggling against 
accusations of electoral fraud.127  In fact, lawmakers within the Philippines have 
questioned Mrs. Arroyo's commitment to enforcing the treaty and warned of a 
backlash if the Marines receive kid-glove treatment.  "This is an emotional issue 
involving our sovereignty and our citizens, and we must take jurisdiction right 
away," says Sen. Richard Gordon, former governor of Subic Bay, the former US 
naval base where the alleged rape occurred.128   
The VFA grants Philippine authorities primary jurisdiction over the 
Marines, however, the VFA also provides the provision for the United States to 
request that the Philippines waive primary jurisdiction.  In this case, the Philippine 
government would have to issue a determination to U.S. authorities that the case 
is “of particular importance to the Philippines” in order to continue primary 
jurisdiction.  The VFA also allows the Marines are allowed to remain in U.S. 
custody until the completion of all judicial proceedings.  The Philippine 
government can, in turn, request that the indicted Marines be turned back over to 
Philippine custody, which they have done.  To date, the U.S. State Department 
has not responded to this request.  If the Marines remain under U.S. custody, the 
 
126 Lum, p.16. 
127 The scandal involves incumbent president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, who allegedly 
rigged the 2004 national election in her favor. The official results of that election gave Gloria 
Macapagal-Arroyo and Noli de Castro the presidency and vice-presidency, respectively. 
Hundreds of national and local positions were also contested during this election. The scandal 
and crisis began in June 2005 when audio recordings were released. This escalated, when a 
minority of the lower house of Congress attempted to subject Arroyo in an impeachment trial. This 
was blocked by Arroyo's coalition allies in September 2005. No trial has taken place thus far. 
128 Christian Science Monitor website. http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/1110/p05s01-
woap.html. Accessed 14 April, 2006. 
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United States is obligated to make them available to Philippine authorities for any 
investigative or judicial proceedings.  If the Marines are tried and convicted by 
Philippine courts, the U.S. and Philippine governments would then have to come 
to a joint agreement on the facilities of detention.129   
By itself, the alleged rape case means little, but in the context of steadily 
increasing U.S. deployments to the Philippines, it could have far reaching 
implications if the Philippine public perceives a travesty of justice has occurred.   
B. OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM: PHILIPPINE HOSTAGE DEBACLE 
By 2003, the GWOT would begin its venture into Iraq.  The United States 
built up a “Coalition of the Willing” in order to shore up international support for 
the invasion of Iraq.  Philippine support for the U.S.-led Coalition did not go as far 
as providing combat troops as the Philippines restricted its personnel to 
humanitarian and reconstruction missions.  The first true test of commitment to 
the reinvigorated U.S.-Philippine alliance came in July, 2004, when a Filipino 
truck driver was abducted by a group known as the Iraqi Islamic Army.  They 
demanded that the Philippines withdraw all of its military and police personnel 
from Iraq within 72 hours or they would behead the hostage130.  After several 
days of failed negotiations from both the international community and the 
Philippine government, the Philippines released a statement that partially agreed 
to the Iraqi Islamic Army’s demands.  The Philippine government agreed to 
withdraw a part of its limited military presence (11 out of 51 soldiers) while 
leaving the rest of its humanitarian contingent in place until their scheduled return 
to the Philippines on August 20th.  This brought about swift condemnation from 
the other members of the Coalition, including the United States, as the 
Philippines had “caved-in” to terrorist demands. 
Ultimately, the Philippine government’s decision to withdraw its troops was 
meant to strengthen its domestic front, despite the weakening of its international 
standing.  President’s Arroyo was facing numerous crises at home, including a 
trying to negotiate with the New Peoples Army after a series of attacks against 
 
129 Lum, p.15. 
130 Tyner, p.103. 
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the AFP, as well as trying to sustain the fragile ceasefire agreements with the 
MILF.  Both groups had issued statements that the President Arroyo was 
ultimately responsible for the Filipino truck driver being put in that situation in the 
first place, and that failure to act would bring about swift repercussions aimed at 
removing her from power131.  Arroyo had also just gone through an attempted 
coup attempt in July, 2003.  Thus, in an attempt to bolster her standing 
domestically, she decided to negotiate with the terrorists.  In a statement issued 
one week after the hostage was released she stated that the Philippines was in a 
special circumstance not shared by other nations: “Unlike the United States, 
Australia, Bulgaria and other countries, we have 1.5 million Filipinos who live and 
work in the Middle East and 4,000 working in Iraq.”  From her point of view, she 
felt she had a responsibility to consider the welfare of these workers, and she 
hoped that her allies would understand these special circumstances132.   
Only time will tell how much of an impact President Arroyo’s decision will 
have on the newly invigorated U.S.-Philippine security alliance.  It may be just a 
bump in the road as the United States may feel that the second front on terror in 
the Philippines justifies continued support of the alliance.  
C. CHINA’S NEGATIVE PERCEPTION OF U.S. STRATEGY IN 
SOUTHEAST ASIA 
China is under the impression that the United States, comfortable in its 
newfound role as the sole superpower, is seeking both hegemonic expansion 
and a containment of China.133  Chinese analysts purport that the proposed 
realignment of forces in Northeast Asia is an overreaction to an imagined 
Chinese threat.  As China is the most likely nation to become a peer competitor, 
China believes that the United States is going to do whatever it can to contain 
them so as to continue its own hegemonic aspirations.  China contends that the 
United States is beginning to focus its center of gravity eastward and is 
attempting to build up alliances in Southeast Asia in an attempt to contain China.  
 
131 Tyner, p.105. 
132 Ibid., p.115. 
133 Sutter, p.41. 
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China points to the dramatic increase in U.S. deployments to the Philippines 
following the 1995-96 Spratly Islands disputes as proof of this strategy.  They 
also feel the United States is attempting containment in several other ways: by 
increasing arms sales to Taiwan, developing national and theater ballistic 
defense, maintaining human rights pressures on China, and imposing politically 
destabilizing and commercially harmful market restrictions on China.  China also 
believes that the United States is intentionally demonizing China so as to 
diminish its standing in the international arena.134   
Of particular interest to the Chinese is the Taiwan situation.  The United 
States government has vocally opposed any attempt to unilaterally change the 
status quo in the Taiwan Strait. The U.S.-Taiwan relationship is guided by the 
Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979 and founded on the Three Joint 
Communiqués (1972, 1979, and 1982) and the One China Policy.  The United 
States maintains that these policies have helped maintain peace and stability for 
the past quarter century.  The United States has two obligations under the TRA: 
to assist Taiwan in maintaining its self-defense capability and retain the capacity 
to resist any use of force against Taiwan. The United States has also expressed 
concern about the widening gap between China's military capabilities and 
Taiwan's ability to defend itself against this threat.  The United States feels that 
its relationship is intended solely to support the development of a modern and 
joint military institution that will promote stability, democracy, and prosperity for 
Taiwan.135  
Beijing is adamantly opposed to this relationship as it contends that the 
United States is interfering in China’s internal affairs.  By maintaining relations 
with Taiwan the United States has heightened the tension in the region and has 
made it more difficult to achieve a peaceful settlement.  Furthermore, Beijing 
believes the strengthening of U.S. bases in Guam and Japan is undoubtedly 
aimed at firmly maintaining U.S. dominance of Northeast Asia and the Taiwan 
 
134 Yong Deng, p.4. 
135 ADM William J. Fallon, US PACOM Commander. Speech before Armed Services 
Committee, 8 March 2005.  
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Strait situation. The Chinese point out numerous events that have led them to 
this conclusion.  First, that former U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander Admiral Blair 
stated that the nuclear powered submarines in Guam could “promptly” help in 
Taiwan’s “self-defense” when conflict breaks out in the Taiwan Strait.136  Second, 
as part of the U.S. force restructuring in the Pacific, the U.S. Marine Corps is 
considering moving some of its forces from Okinawa to the island of Shimoji, 
(also known as Xiadi) an island about 200 miles east of Taiwan.  Additionally, the 
Japanese Self Defense Force is proposing to station four Air Force units, 
including F-15C squadrons, on the island.  Third, the United States is bolstering 
Taiwan's defenses against China's growing naval and air forces with an $18.2 
billion arms package that includes four Kidd Destroyers, 12 P-3C Orion anti-
submarine aircraft, eight diesel-electric submarines and six PAC-3 anti-missile 
batteries.137  China also maintains that the United States has assigned a serving 
officer to the American Institute in Taiwan to strengthen U.S.-Taiwan inter-
operability in case of combat.138
For its part, Taiwan is not helping diminish China’s fears as they welcome 
any potential U.S. and Japanese commitments to Taiwan’s security.  Taiwan has 
always had strong economic, cultural and historical links with Japan and would 
like them to continue.  During the opening ceremony of the 2004 Forum on 
Taiwan-Japan Relations on Oct. 10, Taiwanese Prime Minister Yu Shyi-kun 
mentioned that Japan should discard those restrictions of its pacifist constitution 
that restricted it from playing a more active role in Northeast Asian security and 
defense.  Taiwan is strongly in favor of a stronger Japanese military as it hopes 
that Japan would come to its aid in the event of an attack from China.  Japan 
would most likely do so as it would want to protect its access to the South China 
Sea and the waterways that carry the country's critical oil and natural gas 
 
136 Cited from Li Daguang: “U.S. Military Readjustment of Overseas Deployment Does Not 
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imports.  The prime minister concluded his speech with the expressed hope that 
an alliance could be developed between Taiwan, the U.S. and Japan.139
In the case of the U.S.-Japan alliance, China feels that the United States 
is increasing Japan’s status in its Asia-Pacific strategy, which has led Japan to 
increase its militarist tendencies.  Japan has seized the opportunity of an 
increased U.S.-Japan alliance to boost its own military strength in pursuit of 
becoming a global military power.  Since the conclusion of the Cold War, Japan’s 
defense policies have slowly broken through the post-war peace constitution, 
discarding the “exclusively defensive” defense principle.  The Chinese point out 
many events in recent years to support this view: Prime Minister Koizumi visiting 
the Yasukini Shrine in 2005 and again in 2006; the 2005 Japanese Defense 
White Paper which they feel exaggerates the so-called “China Threat;” the U.S.-
Japanese agreement to share Yokota Airbase; and that Japan’s military is being 
greatly modernized by weapons provided by the United States.  China also feels 
that the United States is encouraging Japan’s militarist tendencies as it will 
intensify confrontation and competition between it and China.  This would mean 
that the power of the two countries would cancel each other out, thereby keeping 
each other in check.  The end result would place the United States in a more 
advantageous position in this three-way relationship- thereby obtaining the dual 
objectives of containing China while also controlling Japan.140
D. ASEAN 
In recent years, China has been actively pursuing cooperative diplomacy 
by institutionalizing Chinese participation in regional dialogues, specifically the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).  Although China initially used its influence to 
prevent ASEAN from being too active, China has grown more skilled at 
multilateral diplomacy as it realizes it can use its memberships in regional 
institutions to advance Chinese political and economic interests.141  The United 
States is using these same regional dialogues to rally support for the Global War 
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on Terror.  With an increased U.S. presence in Southeast Asia under the guise of 
combating terrorism, China feels the United States is inducing a destabilizing 
effect to the region.  Some ASEAN states are catering to U.S. wishes due to self-
interests such as increased economic investment and internal security issues.  
Still others fear that if they seek the same interaction they will be forced into a 
dependent relationship with the United States.  The strategy of pre-emptive 
defense as outlined in both the 2001 and 2005 QDR has led some ASEAN 
members to fear that this would legitimize external intervention into the internal 
affairs of states deemed as harboring or supporting terrorist groups.142  It is for all 
of these reasons that China believes that the increased U.S. interaction in 
Southeast Asia is sowing the seeds of disharmony between ASEAN member 
states.   
The fact that the United States has had a long history of security 
cooperation with Australia also leads China to this assumption.  As a part of its 
Northeast Asian realignment, the United States is planning to build a large joint 
training center in Northern Australia as well as supplying the country with a 
missile defense system.  By giving Australia the “southern anchor” role in the 
U.S. Asia-Pacific security plan, China believes that the United States has 
increased the level of anxiety in Southeast Asia.  This will take the form of arms 
expansion by neighboring ASEAN member states, leading to an ultimate 
destabilization of Southeast Asia.143  
E. MITIGATING FEARS 
Fears regarding U.S strategy in Southeast Asia can be mitigated by 
providing concrete examples on how the annual United States and Philippine 
bilateral exercises have provided a stabilizing effect to the region, specifically in 
the southern Philippines- most notably Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago.  Due 
to this stability, both governmental and non-governmental organizations have 
been able to resume aid to this embattled region.   
 
142 De Castro. “Addressing Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” p.120. 
143 Liu Qing, p.4. 
50
                                           
A shining example of the peaceful foreign policy goals of the United States 
comes through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which 
provides economic, development and humanitarian assistance around the world.  
In the Philippines, USAID has instituted various projects that promote the ideal 
that economic opportunities will in turn strengthen peace in Mindanao.  USAID 
does this by aiding the Philippines in fighting corruption, protecting the 
environment, improving health care and family planning services, and improving 
education in Mindanao.   
Assisting the Philippine government in promoting peace, USAID has 
helped 28,000 former combatants switch from guerilla fighting to farming 
seaweed, hybrid corn, rice or higher value crops.  USAID has also helped 115 
banks and rural cooperatives provide loans and other services which enhance 
small business ownership.144 USAID has also worked with the Philippine 
government to curb rampant corruption, by making it a high risk, low reward 
activity.  The two governments have instituted programs that target the areas 
where corruption can be most damaging: taxes, customs administration, 
government procurement and the judiciary.  The most notable example came in 
2002 when USAID helped the Philippine government strengthen its 2001 Anti-
Money Laundering Act.145  USAID has also helped the Philippine government 
strengthen its economic systems and infrastructure by improving inter-island 
shipping and port facilities.146 
The United States has remained committed to improving the overall 
welfare of the Southern Philippines by promoting health and education reform.  
USAID works with local governments to bolster their ability to deliver better 
health care, particularly in conflict areas or those with few services.  Once 
considered one of the best in all of Asia, the Philippine education system has 
deteriorated significantly in recent years.  USAID seeks to increased access to 
 
144 United States Department of State, USAID website. 
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quality education and livelihood skills in areas most affected by conflict and 
poverty. The focus is on improving the teaching of math, science, English and 
other subjects in Mindanao's public schools.147  Additionally, through investment 
in the Philippine public education system, USAID is attempting to provide an 
alternative explanation for the misinformation provided by radical Islamists in the 
region. 
In April 2006, the U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines, Kristie A. Kenney, 
visited Zamboanga City, where she unveiled U.S.-funded development projects 
and pledged more aid, particularly in former conflict areas.  She signed 
documents for the construction of two bridges in the villages of Sinunuc and 
Taguiti.148   During her trip she also stated that USAID would provide even more 
grants for Mindanao once a peace agreement is signed between the government 
and the MILF.  Additionally, she released information on an upcoming 
deployment of the USNS Mercy, a U.S. hospital ship, to the Autonomous Region 
in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).  The Mercy is being deployed to provide free 
medical aid to thousands of Filipinos on the islands of Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Basilan, 
Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur.149
F. CONCLUSION 
The United States views the Asian-Pacific region as mostly in a state of 
peace, and it intends to create further stability by maintaining its policy of 
vigorous engagement, forward U.S. force presence and strengthened 
alliances.150  In keeping with this strategy, the United States has committed vast 
sums of economic and military assistance to the Republic of the Philippines.  
This assistance has been perceived negatively from both within the Philippines 
as well as from other nations in the Asia-Pacific region.  The United States can  
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diminish these fears through continued acts of constructive international dialogue 





















A. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
Since 1990, the Republic of the U.S.-Philippine Security relationship has 
gone through a series of ebbs and flows.  When the Philippine Senate chose not 
to renew the base treaty, the United States government had no other option but 
to turn over Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base to the Philippines.  This event 
not only marked the end of almost 100 years of a continuous U.S. military 
presence in the Philippines, but also marked that the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines (AFP) was now solely responsible for the country’s external and 
internal security.  With this responsibility came the realization that the AFP was in 
dire need of modernization and was ill-equipped for this daunting task.   
By the mid 1990s rising regional threats coupled with numerous Philippine 
internal security concerns forced both the Philippines and the United States to 
reevaluate their security relationship.  The Philippines still had yet to modernize 
its military and was searching for ways to reintroduce U.S. security assistance to 
its shores.  The U.S., recognizing that the People’s Republic of China appeared 
to be in the beginning of a naval arms build-up in the South China Sea, felt the 
need to act in order to reassure other Asian nations of its security commitment to 
the region.  President Arroyo’s declaration of support to the U.S. anti-terrorism 
campaign in September, 2001 was the key that solving this dilemma as it 
unlocked the door through which U.S. military assistance and equipment could 
once again flow into the country. 
When the United States offered up both economic and military assistance 
to the Philippines in its fight against the Abu Sayyaf Group both the Philippines 
and the United States came away with their agendas satisfied.  The Philippines 
once again had access to large annual amounts of economic and military 
assistance, as well as warm relations with a very powerful ally.  With the 
Philippines now designated a “front-line state” in the Global War on Terror, the 
United States significantly increased its foreign assistance to the country.  This 
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assistance was offered up in recognition of the Philippine Government’s 
acceptance of the Bush administration’s wish to test its new strategy of security.  
These new U.S. strategies were based on encouraging partner nations to 
develop, modernize and transform their own military capabilities.   
Armed with a re-kindled alliance, the United States military was once 
again allowed access to valuable Philippine training areas.  Increased access to 
Philippine training areas was required due to insufficient ranges at the home 
bases of the forward deployed U.S. forces, most notably Okinawa.  The increase 
in training opportunities in the Philippines would also facilitate improvements in 
both the United States and Philippine militaries while simultaneously providing a 
stabilizing effect to crisis ridden Mindanao.   
In the Global War on Terror, the United States faces an irregular enemy 
that is committed to using terror as its primary strategy.  Because of the 
numerous elusive threats to our nation posed by terrorism, the 2004 National 
Security Strategy (NSS) established homeland security as the first priority of the 
Nation.  Within it, the U.S. armed forces was tasked to provide an active, layered 
defense, both at home and abroad.  In the execution of the NSS, the first line of 
defense is abroad and includes mutually supporting activities with U.S. allies to 
counter threats close to their source.    
The proposed realignment of U.S. forces in Northeast Asia will address 
some of these threats to our security while also accomplishing several key 
objectives of our National Military Strategy: the creation of a global anti-terrorism 
environment; providing a forward posture and presence; lastly, promoting 
regional security.151  As outlined in Chapter III, the most successful application of 
this strategy being the 2002 U.S.-Republic of the Philippines bilateral response to 
the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Southern Philippines.   
The U.S. deployment was part of its second phase of the GWOT, directed 
at denying Al Qaeda new home bases and access to human and material 
resources.  Specifically, the U.S. troops deployed to the Southern Philippines 
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were relegated to a purely supporting role: they were allowed to patrol with the 
AFP but they could not engage in any combat operations, as they were 
instructed to merely observe and assess the performance of their Filipino 
counterparts.  Unlike previous Cold War strategy, where the U.S. maintained a 
forward deployed force to ensure security of major Asian air and sea lanes, this 
deployment was to encourage and assist governments in neutralizing terrorist 
organizations that threatened their own countries and global security.  A 
secondary goal was to develop professional armed forces in the region that were 
capable of providing humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, as well as aiding in 
future United Nations Peacekeeping missions.   
Ultimately, the operation was a mixed success.  Two hostages, one 
American and one Filipino, were killed in a firefight between the Abu Sayyaf and 
the AFP during a rescue attempt.  The ASG, although it suffered large losses of 
manpower and material, was not eliminated as it shifted its base of operations to 
Mindanao152.  However, the operation was successful in that upgraded the AFP’s 
combat capability.  Politically, the operation strengthened domestic political 
support for a revitalized U.S.-Philippine alliance as it enhanced the Philippine 
government’s programs of social reform and poverty alleviation in some of the 
poorest parts of the nation.  By the end of 2003, the U.S. had committed $4.6 
billion worth of continued economic and military assistance to the RP.    
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Political conflict and violence between the Philippine government and the 
Muslim separatists in the Southern Philippines has been going on for over three 
decades.  As mentioned previously, the causes are deep and interwoven: low 
degree of political autonomy of Muslims in the region; inability of the state to 
adequately meet the socio-economic needs of the minority Muslim community; 
and lastly, the underlying belief among Muslims that they are victims of 
systematic socio-economic and politico-economic exploitation by the state.  The 
MNLF, the MILF, and the ASG have all sprung up against the Philippine 
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government because of these beliefs.  All of these groups share one thing in 
common- the desire to improve the lives of the Muslim minority.   
As mentioned previously, all groups have engaged in political violence to 
one degree or another.  But it is only the ASG that has opted for the use of 
predominately terror tactics, to the consternation of the other groups.  The 
Philippine government has been able to enter in to peaceful negotiations with two 
of the major insurgent groups, the MNLF and the MILF.  I argue that a lasting 
peace with these groups can only be achieved if the Philippine government 
undertakes a concerted effort to improve the lives of the Muslims in the South.  
This effort will also ultimately aid in the demise of the ASG, as it will no longer 
have a disgruntled population in which to recruit from. Taking the battle to the 
terrorists is not the sole solution to the problem of how best to deal with instability 
in the region.  The United States must continue to aid its allies in achieving 
lasting peace in the region by taking the following actions:  
First, the United States must continue to support the Philippine 
government in the implementation of programs and infrastructure which will 
improve the socio-economic conditions of Muslims in the Southern Philippines- 
starting with education reform.  Radical Islamists have been able to capitalize on 
the existence of a constituency that has been neglected.  With no adequate 
government sponsored educational system in place, the radicals have been able 
to promote ideas which are vehemently anti-Western, producing new radicalized 
intellectuals and willing young conscripts for insurgent groups to draw from.  
Western countries should come to the aid of the Philippines and provide 
unbiased textbooks and other materials that teach global history through 
peaceful competition and integration.  Through investment in a public education 
system these materials could be disseminated, thereby providing an alternative 
explanation for the misinformation provided by the radical Islamists. 
Second, states compete with insurgent groups and terrorists for the 
support and will of the people.  Be deemed legitimate, states must be able to 
provide basic services as protection and welfare to their people.  If not, terrorist 
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groups will be able to exert their will.  The Philippine government must also 
continue to invest in infrastructure in the South.  It is one of the poorest regions in 
the country, with approximately 65% of the population below the poverty line.  
This part of the country has the lowest access to safe drinking water, the least 
access to electricity, toilet and health facilities of any other region153.  To address 
this need, many of the goals of Operation Balikatan 2002 in Basilan were to 
provide infrastructure which would be left behind for the use of the locals.  The 
ASG had successfully put a strangle hold on the island until the U.S.-Philippine 
bilateral response was able to break it.  NGOs had left stockpiles of medicine, 
building materials and bridges on the island that were unable to be delivered to 
the population due to fear.  The combined military and humanitarian assistance 
to the island successfully freed the inhabitants of the ASG’s reign of terror, 
forcing the group to go elsewhere. 
Third, the United States must continue to support the Philippine 
government in the continued investment in the modernization of its military and 
developing a more credible force.  The AFP had been neglected for many years 
due to mistrust of its motives by the Philippine government.  Focused on internal 
security since the birth of the nation, the AFP must develop an adequate counter-
insurgency force, one that is capable of working in a joint environment.  To date, 
the AFP has focused only on conventional warfare techniques, which usually do 
not discriminate between combatant and noncombatant.  The AFP will only be 
able to achieve these goals through the continued support and tutelage of the 
United States.   
Lastly, corruption has been, and continues to be, rampant in both the 
military and the local and state governments.  In order to gain the continued trust 
and support of the people, instances of corruption must be addressed swiftly and 
firmly whenever they are identified.  If not, the state will not be seen as 
illegitimate, thereby providing insurgent groups or terrorists fodder on which to 
feed. 
 
153 Buendia, p.14. 
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In a recent speech, ADM Fallon, Commander U.S. Pacific Command, 
outlined the concern over lawless areas in the Southern Philippines and 
neighboring Indonesia.154  These areas are loosely governed and have historical 
problems which have facilitated both a breeding ground for terror operations as 
well as the creation of alliances with criminal organizations.  The United States is 
dedicated to assisting regional security in Southeast Asia, but is not in the 
business of breaking a country’s sovereignty.  By providing economic and military 
assistance to its allies, the United States can enable them to handle these 
terrorist groups themselves.  This assistance has been perceived negatively by 
some nations within Southeast Asia.  The United States can diminish these fears 
through continued acts of constructive international dialogue that are focused on 
the many successes of the reinvigorated U.S. Philippine alliance. 
The U.S. force realignment in Asia will ensure that our primary line of 
defense remains well forward.  The defense of the United States as well as the 
protection of its allies depends on keeping U.S. forces forward deployed to key 
regions.  This strategy has been successful in enhancing and tying together our 
network of strategic bilateral alliances in the region, as shown during OEF-P, by 
enabling our partners to take the battle to the terrorist forces.   Unfortunately, 
because the ASG is dedicated to the use of terror tactics they can not be 
negotiated with. Therefore, its members must be hunted down and eradicated.  
This task must be completed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines.  Through 
lasting, consistent training exercises between U.S. and Philippine militaries, the 
AFP will become a more capable of completing this task.  It is through precisely 
this type of continued, positive interaction with our allies that the United States 
will not only receive mandatory force sustainment training, it will also gain access 
to information and intelligence that is critical to the anticipation and 
understanding of emerging threats in the region. 
 
154 Speech by Admiral William J. Fallon, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command during lecture 
“Asia Pacific Security: Challenges and Opportunities.” 29 April, 2006. 
Figure 2.  Map of the Republic of the Philippines155
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Figure 3. Map of the southern region of the Philippines, including Mindanao and 
the Sulu Archipelago156  
 
 
                                            
156 Honorary Philippine Consulate South Florida website. 
http://www.pwsdb.com/FortLauderdalePCG/Maps-Phil.php. Accessed 12 May 2006. 
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APPENDIX I  MUSLIM SECESSIONIST GROUPS IN THE 
PHILIPPINES 
A. THE MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (MNLF) AND THE MORO 
ISLAMIC LIBERATION FRONT (MILF) 
Islam was introduced to Southeast Asia by maritime merchants during the 
15th century.  In the regions of what is now Indonesia and Malaysia an 
overwhelming majority of the population accepted the Islamic identity, while in 
the Philippines Muslims were to remain a minority.  The Filipino Muslims, also 
called Moros, constitute 5% of the Philippines’ population and are mainly 
concentrated in the southern portion of the archipelago.  Organized under 
independent sultanates, the Moros successfully avoided Spanish conquest.  
Upon the conclusion of the Spanish American war they fell under United States 
sovereignty.  A reluctant colonial power, from the outset the U.S. stated that its 
policy was to slowly groom the Philippines for eventual self-rule.  On July 4, 
1946, the United States stuck to their promise and formally declared the 
independence of the Philippines, effectively turning all of its inhabitants into 
citizens of the Republic of the Philippines.   
Many Southern Muslims viewed this action as a betrayal of trust as the 
vast majority of Moros did not consider themselves Filipinos due to their religious 
and cultural differences, while making the additional claim that as they had never 
been conquered by the Spanish, they deserved to be an independent state157.   
Despite these complaints, some members of the Muslim political elite aligned 
themselves with the policies of the new state, which included state sponsorship 
of large-scale Christian migration to the Muslim South.  This migration marked 
the beginning of years of economic neglect and political discrimination, which in 
turn led to the creation of a Muslim nationalist separatist movement in the 1960’s.  
In an attempt to unite the country the Philippine government sent several young 
men from non-elite Muslim families to Manila universities on scholarships with 
the goal of integrating the Muslim minority into the Philippine nation.  In the 
 
157 Iacovou, p.1. 
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Muslim South, some of these newly educated young men would return to 
become popular separatist leaders as they provided an alternative to the 
established Muslim leaders who had failed to prevent the massive Christian 
migration.158  
Over the next several years the separatist movement slowly achieved 
success as many of those Muslim leaders who had collaborated with the state in 
1960’s now joined forces with the separatist leaders.  Concurrently, in an effort to 
quell unrest the Philippine government was integrating rebel commanders into 
the state bureaucracy by offering positions which allowed them to govern large 
numbers of Muslims on the condition of defecting from separatist activities.  
Numerous violent clashes between the predominately Christian government and 
the Muslim minority continued until the early 1970s.  The 1971 elections allowed 
many Christian politicians, armed with the help of President Marcos and the 
ruling party, to capture many provincial and municipal offices which had 
traditionally been held by Muslims.   
In September 1972 martial law was declared and the government began 
to disarm the Muslim minority.  This led directly to open rebellion as the Moros 
feared both armed Christian groups as well as military retaliation.  Foremost in 
this struggle was the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), led by Nur Misuary.  
A previous faculty member at the University of Philippines, Misuary argued that 
only through a free and independent state could the Muslims free themselves 
from corrupt leaders and fully implement Islamic institutions. To him, the Moros 
constituted a separate and distinct people—the Bangsamoro people.  With 
Misuary as the chairman, the stated goal of the MNLF is self-determination and 
independence, defined as a prerequisite for the unhindered implementation and 
enhancement of Islamic institutions among the Muslim minority in the 
Philippines159.  The peak of the rebellion came in 1975, when the military arm of 
the MNLF, the Bangsa Moro Army, was able to field some 30,000 armed fighters. 
The AFP responded by deploying 70 to 80 percent of its combat forces against 
 
158 Iacovou,  p.2. 
159 Ibid., p.3. 
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them. Destruction and casualties, both military and civilian, were immense: an 
estimated 50,000 people were killed.  
In response to the unrest, the Organization of the Islamic Conference 
(OIC) and other Muslim international organizations successfully exerted pressure 
on the Philippine government to negotiate for a peaceful settlement to the conflict 
which resulted in the Tripoli Agreement of December 1976.  The Philippine 
government officials and MNLF leaders agreed to a settlement which called for a 
cease-fire and granted autonomy to thirteen predominantly Muslim provinces.  
Unwilling to accept the negotiations with the RP government, the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF) was formed in 1977 when Hashim Salamat, supported by 
ethnic Maguindanaos from Mindanao, split from the MNLF.  The MILF, fielding 
around 9,000 troops, refused to accept the accord and initiated a brief offensive 
that ended in a truce later that month. Unfortunately, the truce did not last and 
conflict continued sporadically until the most recent cease-fire agreement was 
signed in 2000.160   
By mid 1977 the separatist struggle in the Southern Philippines had slowly 
transformed into a popular-based, relatively peaceful movement marked by 
isolated clashes with the RP government.161  With the collapse of the Marcos 
regime in 1985, MNLF leaders, with widespread support from ordinary Muslims, 
entered into main-stream popular politics with the goal of political autonomy for 
Philippine Muslims.162  In 1996, the MNLF signed an agreement relinquishing its 
goal of independence for Muslim regions and its troops were assimilated into the 
AFP as well as the Philippine National Police force.   
The MILF, with an estimated armed strength of 10,000, has emerged as 
the larger of the two groups. Its main political objective has been separation and 
independence for the Muslim region of the southern Philippines. Evidence, 
 
160 Paul Rodell. “The Philippines and the Challenge of International Terrorism,”  in Terrorism 
and Violence in Southeast Asia : Transnational Challenges to States and Regional Stability. Ed. 
by Paul J. Smith, ed., (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2005): p.129. 
161 SarDesai, p.218. 
162 Iacovou, p.4. 
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including the testimonies of captured Jemaah Islamiyah leaders, has pointed to 
strong links between the MILF and JI, including the continued training of JI 
terrorists in MILF camps. This training appears to be important to Jemaah 
Islamiyah’s ability to replenish its ranks following arrests of nearly 500 cadre in 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. MILF leaders deny links with JI and Abu 
Sayyaf, but there are many reports linking some local MILF commands with 
these terrorist organizations. Despite over two years of disavowing links with JI, 
the MILF has not captured any JI cadre.  A stronger collaborative relationship 
has developed between these MILF commands and Abu Sayyaf since 2002. 
Zachary Abuza, U.S. expert on Islamic terrorism in Southeast Asia, has identified 
four of eight MILF base commands as sites of active MILF cooperation with Abu 
Sayyaf and JI. He also has identified the MILF’s Special Operations Group as 
facilitating joint training and joint operations with Abu Sayyaf. JI uses these MILF 
base camps to train both MILF and Abu Sayyaf cadre. Khadaffy Janjalani and 
other Abu Sayyaf leaders reportedly have received sanctuary in at least one 
MILF base camp. 
The MILF has had tenuous cease-fire agreements with the Philippine 
government. The government and the MILF concluded a new truce agreement in 
June 2003, which has resulted in a substantial reduction in violence and armed 
clashes.  However, the cease-fire apparently has not reduced the movement of 
terrorist personnel and materials between Mindanao and the Indonesian island of 
Sulawesi under the direction of JI. (The Mindanao-Sulawesi corridor is one of the 
weakest links in the anti-terrorist efforts of Indonesia and the Philippines backed 
by the United States). Under the truce, a Malaysian observer team visited MILF 
camps in March 2004 and warned MILF leaders to end ties to Jemaah Islamiyah. 
The Malaysian team was a forerunner of a larger team of international observers 
that began to monitor the cease-fire in October 2004 — and presumably MILF-JI 
relations. A new round of Philippine government-MILF political talks has begun. 
In May 2003, the Bush Administration promised U.S. financial support of $30 
million to support a negotiated settlement between the MILF and the Philippine 
government.  
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The negotiations between the MILF and the government have 
concentrated on the extent of autonomy for Muslim areas and Muslim rights to 
“ancestral lands” taken over by non-Muslim Filipinos. Philippine government 
negotiators predicted a peace accord in early 2006; but the Philippine military’s 
Southern Command asserted in December 2005 that it had intelligence 
information that the MILF was violating the cease-fire by recruiting at least 4,000 
new members. MILF leaders denied the charge. Government negotiators and 
advisers to President Arroyo also denied the Southern Command’s charge, 
which reflects divisions between military (AFP) and civilian authorities over 
strategy toward the MILF. The AFP favors a more aggressive strategy and is 
suspicious of a negotiated settlement. Nevertheless, given the active 
collaboration between several MILF base commands and JI and Abu Sayyaf, the 
Southern Command’s accusation of recruiting may be plausible, although Dr. 
Abuza, the U.S. expert cited above, doubts that the number would be near 
4,000.163 This collaboration also suggests that key MILF commanders would not 
support any agreement between the MILF leadership and the Philippine 
government that did not include outright independence for the Muslim areas of 
the southern Philippines. In that scenario, the MILF could split with hard-line 
elements joining even more closely with JI and Abu Sayyaf, which would 
maintain a high level of terrorist operations despite a settlement agreement. The 
Arroyo Administration and presumably the Bush Administration are operating on 
the assumption that the MILF leadership sincerely wants a compromise peace 
and opposes collaboration with JI and Abu Sayyaf. However, there is another 
view that the MILF leadership has a relationship with the hard-line MILF 
commands similar to that between the political organization, Sinn Fein, and the 
armed wing of the Irish Republican Army.  According to this view, the MILF 
leadership is acting as a front for the hard-line commands, shielding them from 
moves against them by the Philippine government and the AFP.164  
 
163 Zachary Abuza. “Balik-Terrorism: The Return of the Abu Sayyaf,” 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB625.pdf. Accessed April 2006.  p.14. 
164 Ibid., p.15. 
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B. RAJAH SOLAIMAN MOVEMENT (RSM)165
The emergence of the RSM in 2005 presents a new terrorist threat to the 
Philippines. Unlike Muslims of the southern Philippines, the RSM appears to be 
composed primarily of Filipinos from the northern Philippines. The RSM has 
emerged from the estimated 200,000 Filipinos who have converted to Islam since 
the 1970s; many of these are Filipino who worked in the Middle East where they 
converted. The RSM’s manpower strength is unknown, but Philippine intelligence 
reports indicate that it has cells throughout the main island of Luzon, including 
metropolitan Manila.16621 Thus, the RSM potentially expands the reach of 
Islamic terrorism to Manila and other parts of the northern Philippines. A Manila 
bombing plot uncovered in March 2004 involved the RSM, according to 
Philippine intelligence officials. The RSM has cooperated with Abu Sayyaf in 
several bomb plots including the February 2004 Manila ferry bombing. The RSM 
also has received financial support and training from elements within the MILF. 
The RSM leader, Ahmed Islam Santos, underwent training in bombing in the 
MILF’s Camp Bushra on Mindanao in December 2001.167
 
165 Lum. p.9. 
166 Montlake, Simon. “Top Terrorism Suspect Falls,” Philippine Daily Inquirer (October 27, 
2005): p.7. 
167 Abuza, pp.35-37. 
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APPENDIX II168
A. BAKER PISTON  
A JIATF West-coordinated ground operations law enforcement training in 
the Philippines. The objective of the Baker exercises (“Piston” designates 
Philippines) is to improve the effectiveness of Philippine counter-drug agencies 
by training those agencies in such topics as: Cordon and search techniques, 
special reconnaissance, medical training, advanced marksmanship, small unit 
tactics in urban terrain, instructor training, mission planning, training 
management, trail interdiction, and movement techniques.  
B. BALANCE PISTON  
Small unit tactics, unconventional warfare, special recon/direct action, 
internal defense operation, CMO, low level air/land tactics, airborne operations, 
live fire exercise, marksmanship, day/night air operations and information 
operations.  
C. BALIKATAN 
Annual JCS directed multi-lateral training exercise with the RP-US Mutual 
Defense Treaty as the basis.  This year’s exercise will focus on Peacekeeping 
Operations (PKO). Training events include Command Post Exercise (CPX), 
Cross-Training Exercise (CTX), Live Fire Exercise (LFX), Humanitarian Civic 
Action (HCA), and Civil Military Operations (CMO). Main objective of “Balikatan” 
(Shouldering the Load Together) is to enhance interoperability of AFP and US 
forces at the operational and tactical level.  
D. L-FCARAT 
LANDING FORCE COOPERATION AFLOAT READINESS AND 
TRAINING.  A USN 7th Fleet annual exercise with the Philippine Navy.  Objective 
of the exercise is to develop interoperability between the two navies. Training 
events include amphibious landings, humanitarian civic action (HCA), diving and 
salvage operations.  
 
                                            
168 Received from Joint United States Military Assistance Group-Philippines, 14 April 2006. 
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E. COBRA GOLD 
This is a US-Thai exercise similar to that of the Philippine Balikatan 
exercise but involves a division-size troop participation, and is also considered as 
multi-lateral exercise with the participation of other countries like Singapore, 
Mongolia and Philippines. 
F. FLASH PISTON 
A JCET Exercise between US Navy and Phil Navy Seals on small unit 
tactics and marksmanship.  Training to include maritime close quarter combat 
and Jungle Environmental Survival Training (JEST). 
G. FUSION PISTON 
Lead:  AFP/PDEA.  Training will cover various aspects of maritime law 
enforcement in support of counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism operations 
(e.g., first aid, boat maintenance, communications, boat handling, evidence 
preservation, patrolling, insert/extract methods, reconnaissance, mission 
planning, and a field training exercise.  Members from the DEA, US Navy SEALS 
and JIATIF-W will conduct training for members of the AFP, PNP, Philippine 
Coast Guard, and the Anti-Illegal Drugs SPECOPS Task Force. 
H. HANDA 
This is a USCINCPAC annual co-hosted game simulation to prepare key 
RP and US national government agencies, armed forces headquarters, and 
component force staffs to better coordinate interagency operations.  Participants 
from the RP include: DND, DFA, NEDA, NICA DILG, AFP, and various RP 
agencies. 
I. MARSEAEX 
MARITIME SEA EXERCISE.  This is a multi-lateral exercise between the 
USN, the Republic of the Philippines Navy (PN), and the Royal Thai Navy (RTN).  
Purpose is to train participants on maritime surveillance procedures and to 






MARITIME SURVEILLANCE EXERCISE.  7th Fleet sponsored USN-PN 
exercise involving US Navy P3 Orion with Philippine Navy surface assets on 
maritime surveillance and search and rescue operations.   
K. MTWS 
MARINE TACTICAL WARFARE SIMULATION.  USMC initiative involving 
computer driven simulated CPX, which revolves around a Combined Amphibious 
Task Force (CATF).  It is designed to train the commanders and staff of a Marine 
Regiment consisting of two or more Battalion Landing Teams (BLT). 
L. PALAH 
Pangdagat Lupat and Himpapawid.  This is a bilateral COMSEVENTH 
FLT Naval Special Warfare exercise with elements of the AFP.  CDR’s Intent - To 
maintain and improve combat readiness and interoperability between US Forces 
and the AFP.  PALAH provides US and RP SEALs an exceptional training 
environment, with an opportunity to improve interoperability between PN/USN in 
areas of maritime special operations, military operations in urban terrain, and 
close quarters combat operations.  Training to be conducted, but not limited to:  
Live Fire, marksmanship, Jungle survival (JEST), OTB environment, Patrolling, 
Military operations in urban terrain, close quarters combat, and mission planning. 
M. PHIBLEX/MEUEX 
  The MEUEX is an AFP-US Armed Forces Bi-lateral exercise to be 
conducted in the Republic of the Philippines (RP).  The scope of the exercise 
includes the Combined Task Force Staff Exercise and Command Post Exercise 
(CTF STAFFEX/CPX) Event, Combined Forces Cross Training and Field 
Training Events, and Combined Civil-Military Operations (CMO) Event. 
N. PIX 
PHILIPPINE INTEROPERABILITY EXERCISE.  US & RP Marines 
Interoperability training focused on infantry and reconnaissance operations. 




Seven Pacific Rim nations, along with the United Kingdom and France, 
are participating in Rim of the Pacific, a major maritime exercise conducted in the 
waters off Hawaii.  RIMPAC brings together maritime forces from Australia, 
Canada, Chile, Peru, France, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom 
and the United States.
P. SAGIP 
This is a trilateral seminar/workshop type of exercise on disaster, search 
and rescue operations with the participation of the United States, Australia and 
Republic of the Philippines. 
Q. SEACAT 
SOUTHEAST ASIA COOPERATION AGAINST TERRORISM.  Multilateral 
exercise which allows Southeast Asian nations to join together in a spirit of 
cooperation against worldwide terrorist threat.  Exercises will give the Armed 
Forces the unique opportunity to exchange ideas and prepare the way for future 
coordinated exercises relevant to regional concerns.  SEACAT supported 
opportunities for the USN and PN to conduct coordinated surveillance and 
tracking operations against maritime vessels of interest. 
R. TALON VISION 
A bilateral Ground-Air Integrated Training (GAIT) exercise with elements 
of the AFP.  CMDR’s Intent (III MEF) - To maintain and improve combat 
readiness and interoperability between U.S. Forces and the AFP.  Talon vision 
provides Marines and sailors an exceptional training environment.  Improve 
interoperability between PN/USN/PHILMAR/USMC in areas of amphibious 
warfare planning, naval surface warfare, helicopter operations aboard ship and 
amphibious operations.   
S. TEAK PISTON 
An Air Force-to-Air Force exercise focusing on low level flight navigation, 
infiltration and exfiltration operations, and air drops. It also includes the 




T. VECTOR BALANCE PISTON 
CT JSOG JCET.  SOCPAC sponsored JCET Exercise specializing in 
Close Quarter Battle and marksmanship skills. This exercise is conducted by the 
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